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Abstract 
 
A target in the Millennium Development Goals—gender parity in all levels of education—is widely 
considered to have been attained. However, measuring gender parity only through school enrollment is 
misleading, as girls may lag behind boys in other educational measures. We investigate this with four rounds 
of surveys from Bangladesh by decomposing households’ education decisions into enrollment, education 
expenditure, and share of the education expenditure allocated for the quality of education like private tutoring. 
We find a strong profemale bias in school enrollment but promale bias in the other two decisions. This 
contradirectional gender bias is unique to Bangladesh and partly explained by the presence of conditional 
cash transfer programs. Although these programs promoted girls’ enrollment in secondary schools, they were 
largely ineffective in narrowing the gender gaps in academic performance and intrahousehold allocation of 
education resources. Gender parity in education cannot be truly achieved without addressing these gaps. 
JEL Classification: D15, I28, J16, O15 
Keywords: Female Stipend Programs; education; conditional cash transfer; private tutoring; Bangladesh 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∗We are very grateful to IDE-JETRO for providing funding for this research. We would like to thank Sonia Akter, Niaz 
Asadullah, Yvonne Jie Chen, Xiaoping Chen, Namrata Chindarkar, Hai-Anh H. Dang, Isaac Ehrlich, Andrew Francis-Tan, 
Nobu Fuwa, Tatsuo Hatta, Christine Ho, Charles Yuji Horioka, Ravi Kanbur, Cem Karayalcin, Jong-Wha Lee, Jing Li, Peng 
Liu, Norihiko Matsuda, Sunha Myong, Manabu Nose, Yohanes Eko Riyanto, Yasuyuki Sawada, Yoshito Takasaki, Long Q. 
Trinh, Wuyi Wang, Jingyi Xue, Jubo Yan, Naoyuki Yoshino, and participants at seminars and workshops organized by the 
University of Tokyo, the National University of Singapore, the Asia Growth Research Institute and the Asian Development 
Bank Institute, Australasian Development Economics Workshop, China Meeting of the Econometric Society, NEUDC 
Conference: Cornell University, Nanyang Technological University, and Florida International University for their comments 
and inputs. 
†National University of Singapore (email: sppxus@nus.edu.sg) 
‡Florida International University (email: shonchoy@fiu.edu) 
§Singapore Management University (email: tfujii@smu.edu.sg) 
1 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
      The last several decades have observed significant progress in education around the globe. A majority of 
children in the developing world, including those with disadvantaged backgrounds, have at least some education 
today. Notably, the spread of education for girls—who were historically disadvantaged—has outpaced that for 
boys in recent years. By 2015, five out of the nine developing regions had achieved gender parity in primary 
school enrollment. Other regions had also substantially narrowed the gender gap. There were 103 girls for every 
100 boys enrolled in primary schools in 2015 in Southern Asia, up from only 74 in 1990. Indeed, Target 3. A of 
the Millennium Development Goals—gender equality in all levels of education—is widely accepted to have 
been achieved (United Nations, 2015). The achievement of gender parity in enrollment is a significant milestone, 
particularly given the positive multiplier or “ripple” effects of girls’ education in all sectors of development 
(Glewwe and Kremer, 2006). 
Developing countries’ dedication of local resources coupled with effective use of donor assistance enabled 
this achievement. Education programs have often been targeted at the groups who are underprivileged and lagging 
behind, such as girls and children from poor households. One notable example is conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
programs. These programs incentivize households to send children to school by giving cash to eligible 
households fulfilling certain conditions such as satisfactory school attendance. For example, the pioneering CCT 
program, Progresa in Mexico, has substantially raised secondary school enrollment for girls and reduced the 
gender gap in schooling in rural areas (Dubois et al.,2012). The Progresa’s success has motivated many other 
countries to adopt CCT programs, which helped those who have been disadvantaged catch up with the rest (See, 
Fiszbein and Schady (2009) for a comprehensive review). 
Nevertheless, looking at gender parity in education only through the narrow lens of school enrollment may only 
lead to an illusion of success. Girls may lag behind boys in other important educational outcomes, even when 
gender parity in school enrollment is achieved. For example, strong gender preference for boys may bias 
intrahousehold allocation of education resources. This, in turn, may lead to a systematic gender gap in education 
quality and performance. Therefore, households’ responses to CCT programs and children’s school performance 
must be taken into account to holistically assess the progress towards gender parity in education, an important 
issue mostly ignored in the existing literature. We explore this issue using household survey data from Bangladesh 
with detailed information on education expenditure. We show that a sizable and statistically significant gender 
gap—conditional on enrollment—persisted in the intrahousehold allocation of education resources, which appears 
to have led to a gender gap in school performance. 
2 
 
 
 
Bangladesh, a predominantly patriarchal country, has achieved a remarkable progress in bringing children to 
school. The recent progress is especially pronounced at the secondary level. The gross secondary school 
enrollment rate for boys [girls] increased from 27 percent [14 percent] in 1990 to 66 percent [72 percent] in 
2016. This noteworthy progress has been supported by a number of interventions implemented by governmental 
and nongovernmental organizations (See Ahmed et al.(2007) for a review). In particular, interventions targeted to 
promote girls’ education have helped eliminate or reverse the gender gap in education in Bangladesh (Ahmed 
et al., 2007; Chowdhury et al., 2002; Shafiq, 2009). At the secondary level, the Female Stipend Programs 
(FSPs)—CCT programs that provide girls with a stipend and tuition fee waiver—have been especially credited 
for narrowing the gender gap in enrollment (Asadullah and Chaudhury, 2009; Behrman, 2015; Khandker et al., 
2003; Mahmud, 2003; Begum et al., 2017). 
Despite this progress, girls are lagging behind boys in various educational outcomes in the secondary and higher 
levels of education. As shown in Figure 1, girls consistently underperform boys, both in terms of passing rates and 
the share of top students in the Secondary School Certificate (SSC) examination— a national exam for secondary 
school completion. Girls also face higher rates of dropout and grade repetition than boys (Schurmann, 2009). If 
the gender difference in the enrollment rate is taken as a sufficient statistic for gender disparity in education, then 
this persistence of girls’ underperformance in secondary education would be puzzling, given the reduction (and 
indeed reversal) of the gender gap in the secondary enrollment rate. This puzzle demonstrates the problem with 
focusing exclusively on gender parity in enrollment. 
Many factors can potentially explain girls’ underperformance in secondary education: low female ratio 
among teachers, unfavorable gender attitudes of teachers, and lack of gender-appropriate school curriculum and 
facilities (e.g., separate toilet facilities for boys and girls). These supply-side factors are relevant and have been 
studied at length in the literature. In comparison, the demand-side constraints that would potentially limit 
education policies and programs are relatively understudied. With this broader perspective, we investigate the 
gender gap from the demand side by highlighting the allocation of education expenditure within the household. 
One methodological challenge in this research is the interdependence of the education decisions on whether 
to send a child to school, how much to spend on the child’s education, and how to spend it. To address this 
challenge, we develop a three-part model consisting of three related education decisions of the household: 1) 
enrollment, 2) total education expenditure conditional on enrollment, and 3) share of the total education 
expenditure on the “core” component—which we argue directly affects the quality of the child’s education and 
includes items such as tuition fee and private tutoring as elaborated in Section 4. 
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Figure 1: The performance at the Secondary School Certificate (SSC) examination by gender over time. The 
solid lines represent the proportions of boys (blue) and girls (red) who have passed the SSC examination among 
those who took the examination and the dashed lines represent the share of top students who achieved the highest 
grade point average (locally known as “GPA 5”). Source: BANBEIS-Education Database 
(http://data.banbeis.gov.bd/) accessed on Oct 29, 2017. 
 
We then apply this three-part model to four rounds of nationally representative household surveys. We find a 
clear profemale bias in the enrollment decision. On the other hand, the decisions on the total education 
expenditure and core share—conditional on enrollment—are significantly promale in the recent three survey 
rounds. For example, girls were 12 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in secondary school than boys in 
2010. However, conditional on enrollment, the total education expenditure and the expenditure on the core items 
for girls in 2010 were lower than those for boys by 617 BDT and 605 BDT 1—about 8 percent and 12 percent 
of the total education expenditure and the expenditure on the core items for boys, respectively. 
This contradirectional gender gap is unique to Bangladesh and noteworthy. In particular, existing studies in 
other South Asian countries such as India and Pakistan tend to find a promale gender gap as elaborated in the 
next section. Therefore, the natural question arises of why a contradirectional gender gap is only found in 
Bangladesh but not in other South Asian countries that have broadly similar cultural, political, and economic 
backgrounds and share historical roots with Bangladesh. Clearly, gender discrimination alone fails to explain 
what is observed in Bangladesh, because it would lead to a 
1Based on the average exchange rate, 1 USD=70 BDT in 2010. 
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codirectional—and not contradirectional—gender gap. 
To better understand the observed contradirectionality of gender gap in Bangladesh, we explore the relevance 
of the FSPs, because a comparable nationwide program did not exist in India or Pakistan during our study period. 
We find some evidence that the FSPs help explain this contradirectionality of gender gap. To be more specific, 
the FSPs were successful in increasing enrollment but not in narrowing the gender gap in education expenditure 
and core share conditional on enrollment. This indicates the presence of gender gap in the quality of education 
once children are in school. Therefore, while CCT programs like the FSPs can be effective in bringing girls to 
school and help improve or even reverse the gender gap in the quantity of education, they may be ineffective in 
narrowing the gender gap in the amount and kind of education resources given to children. Even though policies 
to narrow the gender gap in the quantity of education are desirable, policymakers may also need to consider 
implementing complementary policies, such as school quality improvement programs and vouchers for free 
supplementary or remedial education to improve the quality of education for girls. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We review related studies and discuss our paper’s relevance 
and contributions to the body of existing studies in Section 2. We introduce the three-part model in Section 3, 
followed by the data description and key summary statistics in Section 4. In Section 5, we document the 
contradirectional gender gap using the three-part model. We then investigate the relevance of the FSPs to the 
contradirectionality of the gender gap in Section 6. We offer a diagrammatical analysis to explain our findings 
coherently and explore the relevance of our findings to the labor market returns in Section 7. Some discussions 
are provided in Section 8. 
 
2 Relevance and Contributions to Existing Literature 
 
This study contributes to the literature on intrahousehold allocation of resources for human capital investment 
in developing countries. Previous studies highlighted a gender bias whereby parents systematically invest more 
resources on sons’ education (e.g., Deaton (1989), Li and Tsang (2003)). 
Employing a hurdle model, Kingdon (2005) find a promale bias in the enrollment decision, but no evidence of 
a gender bias in education expenditure among enrolled children in rural India. Azam and Kingdon (2013) revisit 
this study with more comprehensive data from India and find that the promale bias has persisted. This finding is 
further supported by Majumder et al. (2016) using Heckman’s two-step model in West Bengal and Saha (2013) 
using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. 
Besides India, the hurdle model has also been applied to other countries, including Malaysia (Kenayathulla, 
2016), Pakistan (Aslam and Kingdon, 2008), Paraguay (Masterson, 2012), and Sri Lanka 
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Table 1: Existing studies on gender gap in education expenditure using a hurdle model 
 
 
Study Location & Year Age Grp Enroll Cond. Exp. 
Kingdon (2005) 16 states in rural India, 1994 5 to 14 − ≈ 
Aslam and 
Kingdon (2008) 
Pakistan, 2001-02 5 to 9 
10 to 14 
− 
− 
≈ 
− 
Himaz (2010) Sri Lanka, 1990-91, 1995-96, 
2000-01 
5 to 9 
10 to 13 
14 to 16 
≈ 
≈ 
≈ 
+ 
≈ 
+ 
Masterson (2012) Rural Paraguay, 2000-01 
Urban Paraguay, 2000-01 
5 to 14 
5 to 14 
− 
+ 
− 
+ 
Azam and 
Kingdon (2013) 
India, 2004-05 5 to 9 
10 to 14 
≈ 
− 
− 
− 
Kenayathulla (2016) Malaysia, 2004-05 5 to 14 ≈ ≈ 
Note: −, + and ≈ mean promale bias, profemale bias and no bias, respectively. 
 
(Himaz, 2010). The main results of the aforementioned studies using a hurdle model are summarized in Table 1. 
For example, Aslam and Kingdon (2008) find that there is a significant promale bias in enrollment decision for 
children aged 5-9 and 10-14 in Pakistan. However, a promale bias in education expenditure conditional on 
enrollment is found only for children aged 10-14. 
Table 1shows that promale bias is far from ubiquitous; Masterson (2012) find promale bias in rural areas but 
profemale bias in urban areas in Paraguay. In Malaysia, no gender gap was found (Kenayathulla, 2016), whereas 
profemale bias was also detected in Sri Lanka (Himaz, 2010). Wongmonta and Glewwe (2017) also find a gender 
gap in favor of females in Thailand, though not based on a hurdle model. Table 1also shows that the directions of 
gender biases in enrollment and conditional education expenditure decisions are never contradirectional (i.e., if 
one of them is significantly profemale [promale], then the other is never significantly promale [profemale]). 
Therefore, the contradirectional gender bias documented in detail below is new. It is notable that the 
contradirectional gender bias in Bangladesh contrasts with a clear (codirectional) promale bias in India and 
Pakistan, particularly for the older age group. The contradirectional bias is important because it is persistent and 
prevalent. It is clearly present since 2000 and found both in urban and rural areas. The evidence for the presence 
of the contradirectional bias is also robust. In particular, it is still detected even after taking into account the 
gender difference in the intrahousehold competition among siblings. 
This paper also makes a modest methodological contribution by extending the hurdle model to include a 
third equation for the core share in the total education expenditure. This additional equation 
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enables us to detect the gender bias in the way education expenditure is used. Furthermore, we allow for 
correlations in the unobservable error terms across different decisions. By taking advantage of this correlational 
structure, we are potentially able to obtain more accurate estimates than the equation-by-equation regressions 
widely used in the literature. 
This paper also contributes to the growing literature on the impact of CCT programs. CCT programs are 
found to be effective in promoting school enrollment for the targeted population (e.g., Khandker et al. (2003); 
Mahmud (2003); Glewwe and Kassouf (2012); Behrman et al. (2009)), though they may not help to improve 
education quality as shown in Mexico (Behrman et al.,2009), Bangladesh (Khandker et al., 2003), and Brazil 
(Glewwe and Kassouf, 2012). The impact of CCT on test scores, as a measure of educational performance, is 
weak at best (Saavedra and Garc ı´a, 2012). We offer a new angle in this literature by examining the allocation of 
education resources within the household in the presence of a CCT program.2 
Consistent with previous studies, we find that CCT programs were effective in bringing girls to schools. 
However, they did not attract a sufficient amount of complementary investment from the household. The gap 
between enrolled boys and girls in school performance did not narrow as a result. While our analysis is based 
only on Bangladeshi data, the lack or inadequacy of complementary investment from the household may be 
among the important reasons why CCT programs did not achieve notable improvements in educational outcomes 
beyond attendance. Thus, this study offers a cautionary lesson to researchers and policymakers that simply 
increasing the enrollment of female students does not automatically narrow the gender gap in the quality of 
education that children receive.3 
Beyond the empirical findings discussed above, we offer some plausible explanations why there is a lack of 
complementary investment from the households with a simple diagrammatic model of the market for education 
quality and discuss the relevance of labor market returns. While these explanations are somewhat speculative 
due to the lack of data, they may offer some guidance to policymakers and researchers where challenges may 
exist in reducing the gender gap in the quality of education. 
 
3 The Three-Part Model 
 
We extend the hurdle model proposed in Kingdon (2005)—a model consisting of decisions on the child’s school 
enrollment and the amount of education expenditure conditional on enrollment—in two 
2Note also that there are a number of studies that have examined the impact of CCT programs on noneducational 
outcomes such as health and cognitive abilities (Gertler, 2004; Fernald et al., 2008; Orazio et al., 2010; Paxson and Schady,  
2010; Macours et al., 2012). While noneducational outcomes are also important, they are beyond the scope of this study. 
3A related point was made in Shonchoy and Rabbani (2015). However, we provide more complete and coherent 
explanations of this phenomenon with a more rounds of survey data. Unlike Shonchoy and Rabbani (2015), we also 
investigate the gender differences in educational performance and investigate the relevance to the labor market returns. 
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directions. First, we extend the hurdle model to account for the gender difference in the way the education 
expenditure is used, a point that is mostly neglected in the literature. To see the relevance of this point, first 
consider a household with a boy and a girl in which an equal amount is spent on their education. Suppose further 
that the education expenditure for the boy is mostly used to pay for private tutoring, whereas that for the girl is 
mostly used to buy better or more uniforms. This gender difference in the pattern of education expenditure would 
result in a gender difference in the quality of education. To address this point, we classify education expenditure 
items into the core and peripheral components, where the former directly relates to the quality of education but 
the latter does not, as detailed in the next section. We then incorporate the core share of education expenditure 
as the third part of the model. 
Second, we allow for correlations in unobservable error terms across all equations. This is important because 
there may be some unobservable characteristics, which may affect all three decisions simultaneously. Take 
innate ability as an example. A smart child (with high innate intellectual ability) is arguably more likely to be 
enrolled in school due to high expected returns from education. However, the child may require less education 
expenditure from the household than a less smart counterpart, because of a lower need for private tutoring or a 
higher chance of receiving merit-based scholarships. At the same time, households may be more encouraged to 
invest in children with a higher ability to learn. Our model enables the data to tell the sign and size of the 
correlations among the unobservable error terms. 
Formally, we consider the following three outcome variables: school enrollment (d ∈ {0, 1}), education 
expenditure (y(> 0)), and core share in education expenditure (s ∈ [0, 1]), and our three-part model has the 
following structure: 
 𝑑 = 𝟏(𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑 + 𝜀𝑑 > 0) (1) 
 log𝑦 = 𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦 + 𝜀𝑦 (2) 
 𝑠 = max(0,min(1, 𝑥′𝑠𝛽𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠)), (3) 
where 1(·) is an indicator function, and x, β, and s in each equation are the vector of covariates, its coefficient 
vector, and the idiosyncratic error term. The covariates include, among others, a dummy variable for girl to 
identify the gender effect. The observed share s is related to its latent variable 𝑠∗ ≡ 𝑥′𝑠𝛽𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠, and s is a 
truncated version of s∗ from below at zero and from above at one. It should be noted that the education 
expenditure (y) and core share (s) are observable if and only if the child is enrolled in school (i.e., d = 1). 
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         To allow for the dependency across the three equations, we assume that the error terms 𝜀𝑑, 𝜀𝑦, and 𝜀𝑠  
have the following trivariate normal distribution: 
 
[
𝜀𝑑
𝜀𝑦
𝜀𝑠
] ~𝑁(𝟎, [
1 𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜎𝑦 𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜎𝑠
𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜎𝑦 𝜎𝑦
2 𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠
𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜎𝑠 𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠 𝜎𝑠
2
]), (4) 
where the variance of sd can be assumed to be unity without loss of generality. In what follows, we denote the 
probability density function and cumulative density function (CDF) for a standard normal distribution by 𝜙 and 
Φ, respectively, and the CDF for a standard bivariate normal distribution by Ψ. There are four distinct cases to 
consider in this setup: 1) the child is not enrolled in school (d = 0), 2) the child is enrolled in school with all 
education expenditure going to the peripheral component (d = 1 and s = 0), 3) the child is enrolled in school with 
education expenditure going to both the core and peripheral components (d = 1 and 0 < s < 1), and 4) the child 
is enrolled in school with all education expenditure going to the core component (d = 1 and s = 1).4 
           Given the model structure described by eqs. (1)-(4), the log-likelihood li for child i ∈ {1, · · · , N } given 
the parameter vector 𝜃 ≡ [𝛽𝑑 , 𝛽𝑦, 𝛽𝑠, 𝜎𝑦, 𝜎𝑠, 𝜌𝑑𝑦, 𝜌𝑑𝑠, 𝜌𝑦𝑠]′can be written as follows:
5 
 
 𝑙𝑖(𝜃) = 1[𝑑𝑖 = 0] ⋅ 𝑙𝑖
1 + 1[𝑑𝑖 = 1, 𝑠𝑖 = 0] ⋅ 𝑙𝑖
2 
 +1[𝑑𝑖 = 1,0 < 𝑠𝑖 < 1] ⋅ 𝑙𝑖
3 + 1[𝑑𝑖 = 1, 𝑠𝑖 = 1] ⋅ 𝑙𝑖
4, 
where the log-likelihood 𝑙𝑖
𝑗
 for case 𝑗 ∈ {1,2,3,4} is given by the following with  𝑒𝑦 ≡
log(𝑦)−𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦
𝜎𝑦
  and  
𝑒𝑠 ≡
𝑠−𝑥′𝑠𝛽𝑠
𝜎𝑠
: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4Cases 2) and 4) are relatively rare in our data, accounting for 0.27 percent and 0.22 percent of all observations across years, 
respectively. 
5The detailed derivation of the likelihood function for each case is provided in Appendix A. 
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{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑙𝑖
1 = log[Φ(−𝑥′𝑑𝑖𝛽𝑑)]
𝑙𝑖
2 = log(𝜙(𝑒𝑦𝑖)) − log(𝑦𝑖) − log(𝜎𝑦)
+log [Ψ(
𝑥′𝑑𝑖𝛽𝑑+𝜌𝑑𝑦𝑒𝑦𝑖
√1−𝜌𝑑𝑦
2
, −
𝑥′𝑠𝑖𝛽𝑠+𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑦𝑖
𝜎𝑠√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
,
𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑦𝑠−𝜌𝑑𝑠
√(1−𝜌𝑑𝑦
2 )(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )
)]
𝑙𝑖
3 = log(𝜙(
𝑒𝑦𝑖
√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
))+ log(𝜙(
𝑒𝑠𝑖
√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
))
+(𝜌𝑦𝑠
𝑒𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖
1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 ) − log(𝑦𝑖) − log(𝜎𝑦) − log(𝜎𝑠) − log(√1 − 𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )
+log [Φ(
𝑥′𝑑𝑖𝛽𝑑(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )+(𝜌𝑑𝑦−𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜌𝑦𝑠)𝑒𝑦𝑖+(𝜌𝑑𝑠−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑦𝑠)𝑒𝑠𝑖
√(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 −𝜌𝑑𝑦
2 −𝜌𝑑𝑠
2 +2𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜌𝑦𝑠)(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )
)]
𝑙𝑖
4 = log(𝜙(𝑒𝑦𝑖)) − log(𝑦𝑖) − log(𝜎𝑦)
+log [Ψ(
𝑥′𝑑𝑖𝛽𝑑+𝜌𝑑𝑦𝑒𝑦𝑖
√1−𝜌𝑑𝑦
2
,
𝑥′𝑠𝑖𝛽𝑠−1+𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑦𝑖
𝜎𝑠√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
,
𝜌𝑑𝑠−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑦𝑠
√(1−𝜌𝑑𝑦
2 )(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )
)] .
 
 
The sample log-likelihood function is just the summation of individual log-likelihood function. Therefore, 
the maximum-likelihood (ML) estimator 𝜃𝑀𝐿 for the three-part model can be written as follows: 
𝜃𝑀𝐿 = argmax
𝜃
∑
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑙𝑖(𝜃). 
The primary coefficients of interest are those on the girl dummy in βd, βy, and βs. If these coefficients have 
positive [negative] signs, they indicate a profemale [promale] bias. It should be noted here that the size of the 
coefficient does not necessarily equate with the size of the effect, because the model is nonlinear. Therefore, 
using the ML estimates, we calculate the marginal effects of being a girl on the probability of enrollment as well 
as conditional and unconditional levels of the total education expenditure and core expenditure. Because we 
cannot obtain a simple closed-form solution for the marginal effect due to the correlation across error terms, we 
need to use numerical integration to calculate marginal effects. The girl effects on d, y, and s are computed as 
the change in the expected value of the outcome of interest when the value of the girl dummy variable changes 
from zero to one, where we use the following expressions for the conditional and unconditional expectations: 
𝐸(𝑑) = 𝑃(𝑑 = 1) = Φ(𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑)         (Expected enrollment) 
𝐸(𝑦|𝑑 = 1) = ∫
∞
0
𝑦𝑓(𝑦|𝑑 = 1)𝑑𝑦   (Conditional expected education expenditure) 
𝐸(𝑦) = 𝑃(𝑑 = 1)𝐸(𝑦|𝑑 = 1)           (Unconditional expected education expenditure) 
       𝐸(𝑦𝑠) = ∫
1
0
∫
∞
0
𝑦𝑠𝑓(𝑦, 𝑠)𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑠    (Unconditional expected core expenditure) 
      𝐸(𝑦𝑠|𝑑 = 1) =
𝐸(𝑦𝑠)
𝑃(𝑑=1)
=
𝐸(𝑦𝑠)
Φ(𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑)
              (Conditional expected core expenditure)
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Figure 2: Nominal education expenditure in BDT by year, gender, and grade 
 
where f (y, s) is the joint probability density function for y and s, and the subscript i is omitted for simplicity. 
We use simulations to compute the standard errors for the equations above and evaluate only at the sample 
means to reduce the computational burden of numerical integrations.6 
 
4 Data 
 
We primarily use the nationally representative Household Expenditure Survey (HES) for the year 1995 and 
Household Income Expenditure Survey (HIES) for the years 2000, 2005, and 2010, all of which were conducted 
by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. These datasets provide demographic and socioeconomic characteristics 
of the household and detailed information on education expenditure for each child in the household.7 
Figure 2 depicts the average education expenditure conditional on enrollment for boys and girls and their 
difference for each grade, including both the primary (grades 1-5, officially ages 6-10) and secondary (grades 6-10, 
officially ages 11-15) levels.8 There are three points to note from this figure. First, across all survey years, the 
education expenditure increases with grade, particularly from the secondary level. 
6The details of the mathematical expressions used for numerical integrations and the simulation method for computing 
the marginal effects are described in Appendix B. 
7Top one percent observations with the highest total educational expenditure are dropped as outliers. Further, to apply 
the three-part model to the data, we choose to drop from our sample around 0.39 percent of children who were enrolled in 
secondary school with no education expenditure. As a result, the education expenditure for a child in our sample is always 
positive (i.e., y > 0) whenever the child is enrolled in school (i.e., d = 1). 
8Secondary education is sometimes subdivided into junior secondary (grades 6-8, officially ages 11-13) and secondary 
(grades 9-10, officially ages 14-15) levels in Bangladesh. We do not make this distinction. 
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Second, boys receive a larger investment in education than girls conditional on enrollment. Third, except for the 
year 1995, the gender gap in education expenditure tends to widen as the grade progresses, especially at the 
secondary level. 
Therefore, secondary education appears to be particularly important for the analysis of gender gap. It is also 
worth noting that the gender policies of government interventions are different between the primary and 
secondary levels. The FSPs were targeted only at girls in secondary schools, whereas the Food for Education 
program, started in 1993, and its successor, the Primary Education Stipend program, started in 2002, were not 
targeted by the child’s gender. Furthermore, passing the SSC examination, which is held at the end of the 
secondary education, is a major milestone in the Bangladeshi education system.9 For these reasons, we choose to 
focus on the secondary education. 
We include the following basic covariates in each of the three equations (eqs. (1)-(3)) in all reported three-part 
regressions: the age and gender of the child, the age and gender of the household head, logarithmic household 
size, logarithmic expenditure per capita, the number of children, head’s working status and religion, and parental 
education in years. In addition, we also include the urban dummy to capture the geographical heterogeneity in 
parental investment in children’s education. The choice of these covariates are broadly consistent with existing 
studies such as Kingdon (2005), Aslam and Kingdon (2008), Masterson (2012), and Azam and Kingdon (2013). 
Some covariates are assumed to affect some but not all outcomes. In eq. (1), the numbers of secondary 
schools and madrasas per thousand people in the area of residence are included in the set of covariates as 
measures of school accessibility in addition to the basic covariates discussed above. We argue that this is 
reasonable, because school accessibility would primarily affect the enrollment decision, particularly in 
developing countries where school infrastructure is inadequate. On the other hand, it would not heavily affect 
education expenditure once the type of school that the child goes to is controlled for. 
To construct the accessibility measures, we compile the number of schools and madrasas at the district or 
subdivision level (district-level data from BANBEIS (1995), BANBEIS (2006), and BANBEIS (2010) for the 
years 1995, 2005, and 2010 and subdivision-level data from Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (2002) for the year 
2000) and divide by the population at that level using the population 
9 The analysis of older age groups, including the higher secondary and tertiary levels, are beyond the scope of this 
paper, because the analysis gets more complicated for three reasons. First, early marriage and pregnancy can result in grade 
repetition and dropout for girls, but we have only limited information about each child beyond gender and age. As a result, 
our three-part model cannot adequately address these issues and our estimates are likely to be confounded with early 
marriage and pregnancy. Second, the passing rate of the SSC examination was historically low, below 60 percent for most 
years before 2007 as Figure 1 shows. This makes it difficult to see whether the child is not in school because of not being 
able to pass the SSC or some other reasons. Finally, the proportion of girls in higher education was very small in earlier 
years, making it difficult to attain reliable estimates. 
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figures taken from the Population and Housing Census for the year 2001.10 
In eq. (2), we add two school-type variables (public and private) as different types of schools may affect 
tuition, uniform, and other education expenditure differently.11 The logarithmic education expenditure is separately 
added to control for the education expenditure in the core share equation (eq. (3)). 
The upper part of Table 2 reports some descriptive summary statistics for the secondary school enrollment 
and its covariates in the secondary-school age group, disaggregated by the child’s gender for the years 1995 and 
2010. It shows impressive gains in a variety of development indicators between 1995 and 2010, including the 
enrollment rate, nominal household income, and mother’s education. The bottom part of the table provides a 
breakdown of the school types among children who are enrolled in a secondary school.12 
There are two important observations to make from Table 2. First, the first row shows that girls are on average 
more likely to be enrolled in secondary school than boys. The gender difference in enrollment was small and not 
significantly different from zero in 1995 even at a 10 percent level, but it has become larger and statistically 
significant since the year 2000. This is consistent with the common observation of the reversal of the gender gap 
from promale to profemale in school enrollment in Bangladesh in recent years (e.g., Asadullah and Chaudhury 
(2009)). 
Second, Table 2 shows that there are some important differences between boys and girls in the demographic 
characteristics of the households they belong to. In particular, girls tend to live in a larger household than boys, 
and this difference is observed for all rounds of the survey. We will revisit this point in the next section. 
To apply the three-part model to data, we categorized the education expenditure items into core and peripheral 
components. We choose to include expenditures for tuition, private tutoring, and materials (e.g., textbooks, 
exercise books, and stationary) in the core component. The peripheral component includes all other items, 
including admission, examination, uniform, meals, transportation, and others, which would only have a marginal 
relevance to the quality of education at best. 
Because the choice of items in the core component is not an obvious choice, let us explain the reasons 
10In 1991, there were 5 divisions, 64 districts, and 486 subdistricts in Bangladesh (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics,1994, 
Table 2.7). While subdivision is not a commonly used unit, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (2002) divides Bangladesh into 
22 subdivisions. 
11The base school type in the regressions reported in Section 5 is all schools other than public and private schools, 
which include NGO schools and madrasas. While the choice of school type is potentially important, we choose not to model 
it for two reasons. First, public secondary schools are rare in Bangladesh, which accounts for less than five percent of all 
secondary schools (BANBEIS, 1995, 2006, 2010). Second, there is a significant mismatch in the type distribution of 
secondary schools between the HIES data and other sources. The proportion of children in public schools in our data is 
around 20 percent, which is much higher than five percent or less reported by BANBEIS(1995, 2006, 2010) and Nath et 
al. (2008). This discrepancy may in part stem from the public nature of private schools in Bangladesh, where private school 
teachers are often paid by the government under the Monthly Pay Order scheme. It should also be noted that our results 
remain qualitatively similar even when the school-type variables are dropped from the regression. 
12The summary statistics for the years 2000 and 2005 corresponding to Table 2 are reported in Table 16 in Appendix F. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of basic covariates by gender for 1995 and 2010 (secondary-school age group) 
 
 
  1995     2010  
Boy (B) Girl (G) G-B All  Boy (B) Girl (G) G-B All  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  
All children aged 11-15           
Enrolled in secondary school 0.349 0.370 0.021 0.359  0.465 0.560 0.095 0.511  
 (0.477) (0.483)  (0.480)  (0.499) (0.496) *** (0.500)  
Child’s age (yrs) 13.022 12.903 -0.119 12.966  12.980 12.896 -0.084 12.940  
 (1.369) (1.351) *** (1.362)  (1.389) (1.372) ** (1.382)  
HH per capita expenditure 10.222 11.512 1.290 10.832  28.434 28.659 0.225 28.543  
(thousand BDT/year) (8.062) (11.161) *** (9.673)  (19.044) (21.466)  (20.248)  
Household size 6.634 6.807 0.173 6.716  5.518 5.605 0.087 5.560  
 (2.507) (2.518) ** (2.513)  (2.005) (1.868) * (1.940)  
Father’s education (yrs) 3.691 3.951 0.260 3.814  2.780 2.832 0.052 2.805  
 (4.426) (4.578) ** (4.500)  (4.150) (4.172)  (4.160)  
Mother’s education (yrs) 1.960 2.262 0.302 2.103  2.484 2.579 0.095 2.530  
 (3.085) (3.347) *** (3.215)  (3.595) (3.674)  (3.633)  
Number of children 3.658 3.794 0.136 3.722  2.932 3.036 0.104 2.982  
 (1.862) (1.913) ** (1.888)  (1.438) (1.444) *** (1.442)  
Urban 0.314 0.365 0.051 0.338  0.342 0.335 -0.007 0.339  
 (0.464) (0.482) *** (0.473)  (0.474) (0.472)  (0.473)  
Female head 0.084 0.089 0.005 0.086  0.131 0.139 0.008 0.135  
 (0.277) (0.285)  (0.281)  (0.337) (0.346)  (0.342)  
Head is a wage worker 0.354 0.365 0.011 0.359  0.407 0.404 -0.003 0.405  
 (0.478) (0.482)  (0.480)  (0.491) (0.491)  (0.491)  
Head’s age (yrs) 46.466 46.556 0.090 46.508  47.142 46.827 -0.315 46.990  
 (11.188) (11.115)  (11.152)  (10.597) (10.554)  (10.577)  
Muslim 0.898 0.890 -0.008 0.894  0.898 0.887 -0.011 0.892  
 (0.303) (0.313)  (0.308)  (0.303) (0.317)  (0.310)  
Hindu 0.094 0.101 0.007 0.097  0.093 0.103 0.010 0.098  
 (0.292) (0.301)  (0.296)  (0.290) (0.305)  (0.297)  
Obs 2,641 2,370  5,011  3,209 2,996  6,205  
Children aged 11-15 enrolled in a secondary school 
Govt school 0.16 0.18 0.02 0.17 0.23 0.20 -0.03 0.22 
 (0.37) (0.39)  (0.38) (0.42) (0.40) * (0.41) 
Private school 0.79 0.81 0.02 0.80 0.70 0.69 -0.01 0.70 
 (0.41) (0.40)  (0.40) (0.46) (0.46)  (0.46) 
Other school 0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.09 
 (0.21) (0.11) *** (0.17) (0.26) (0.30) *** (0.28) 
Obs 921 877  1,798 1,493 1,679  3,172 
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below the mean. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote that the means for girls and 
boys are different at 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively, by a t-test of equality of means. Other school 
includes all types of schools other than public and private schools, including religious schools (like madrasas) and NGO 
schools. 
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for including tuition, private tutoring, and materials in the core component. First, it is reasonable to include the 
tuition fee in the core component because it reflects, at least to some extent, the quality of education provided by 
schools in Bangladesh. If schools face some degree of competition, those schools which consistently provide only 
low-quality education at a high tuition will exit the market such that a positive correlation between the quality of 
education and tuition would emerge. The force of competition is likely to be important in Bangladesh where a large 
majority of secondary schools are private. Further, as elaborated in Appendix C, an analysis of a separate dataset 
shows a positive relationship between the average tuition fee and test score at the primary level, which serves 
as suggestive evidence that a higher tuition reflects higher quality of education. 
Second, private tutoring is also a key item of the core component. It is widely documented that private 
tutoring can be an important educational input (Bray, 1999, 2003), because it is associated with better learning 
achievements for the students (Nath, 2012; Asadullah et al., 2018). This is also the case in Bangladesh (Nath, 
2008; Hamid et al., 2009); it is not uncommon in Bangladesh for public school teachers to serve as private tutors 
for their students. In some cases, teachers may deliberately teach less in the regular classes to gain more incomes 
from private tutoring. Thus, there are good reasons to include private tutoring in the core component. 
Nevertheless, the spending on private tutoring must be interpreted with caution. On one hand, private 
tutoring would raise the overall quality of education that the child receives. On the other hand, if private tutoring 
is given only to weaker students and boys are generally weaker than girls, the promale bias in the core share we 
show subsequently may be driven by the relatively weak academic performance of boys. We argue that this latter 
possibility is unlikely to be important, given that girls have underperformed boys in the passing rate and the 
share of top students in the SSC examination over years as shown in Figure 1. 
Finally, it is also reasonable to include materials in the core component, because reading more textbooks 
and doing more exercises also directly contribute to the academic performance. However, one could argue that 
more expensive books are not necessarily of higher quality. Thus, the inclusion of materials in the core 
component is admittedly disputable. To address this concern, we also repeated the analysis in the next section 
excluding the materials from the core component (unreported). It turns out that the results are qualitatively 
similar. Thus, our results are not driven by the inclusion of the materials in the core component. In sum, our 
choice of the definition of the core component is reasonable, if not undisputable. 
Table 3 reports summary statistics of education expenditure items in nominal terms for the years 1995 and 
2010 using a subsample of children who were enrolled in secondary school at the time of 
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Table 3: Summary statistics of annual education expenditure in BDT by items for secondary school enrollees 
in 1995 and 2010 
 
 
  1995     2010  
Boy (B) Girl (G) G-B % Zeros  Boy (B) Girl (G) G-B % Zeros  
Item (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  
Core 1,673 1,582 -91 1  5,239 4,285 -955 0  
 (1,616) (1,540)    (5,082) (4,363) ***   
Tuition 275 194 -81 32  549 296 -253 46  
 (313) (305) ***   (963) (606) ***   
Private Tutoring 803 789 -14 45  3,273 2,627 -647 26  
 (1,298) (1,226)    (4,335) (3,745) ***   
Material 595 600 5 1  1,418 1,362 -55 1  
 (429) (415)    (950) (929) *   
Peripheral 717 747 30 1  2,110 2,067 -43 0  
 (878) (791)    (2,224) (2,077)    
Admission 126 138 12 24  371 337 -35 21  
 (211) (197)    (657) (561)    
Exam 115 124 9 5  301 295 -6 5  
 (146) (139)    (288) (270)    
Uniform 215 249 34 45  619 630 11 19  
 (290) (278) **   (534) (658)    
Meal 40 5 -35 99  424 377 -47 58  
 (464) (58) **   (806) (744) *   
Transportation 87 109 22 81  205 311 107 85  
 (333) (394)    (818) (1,080) ***   
Others 133 122 -11 44  190 117 -73 75  
 (281) (344)    (1,273) (776) *   
Total 2,390 2,329 -61   7,349 6,352 -998   
 (2,112) (2,030)    (6,151) (5,524) ***   
Core Share 0.68 0.65 -0.03   0.67 0.63 -0.04   
 (0.19) (0.20) ***   (0.18) (0.19) ***   
Obs 921 877    1,493 1,679    
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below the mean. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote that the means for girls and 
boys are different at 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. The summary statistics are for the subsample 
of the children who were enrolled in school at the time of survey. Core share stands for the ratio of core components 
over the total education expenditure. The annual session and registration fees are included in admission because they 
are not separately reported in HES 1995. 
 
survey.13 The italicized items below each of Core and Peripheral rows represent the underlying items in these 
component, respectively. As the bottom of the table shows, the average total education expenditure has rapidly 
increased between 1995 and 2010. Its annualized average growth rate in this period is 7.3 percent, which is 
substantially larger than the average annual inflation rate of 5.9 percent in consumer prices based on the World 
Development Indicators. 
Table 3 also shows that the core component accounts for roughly two thirds of the total education 
expenditure and boys have a significantly higher core share than girls. Within the core component, private 
tutoring is the major expenditure item, but a considerable share of children have no spending on 
13The same summary statistics for the years 2000 and 2005 are reported in Table 17 in Appendix F. 
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private tutor in both years. There is an obvious trend of increasing popularity in private tutoring over the years, 
particularly among higher grades. In 1995, 56 percent of male and 54 percent of female secondary school students 
reported to have spent a positive amount on private tutoring, but these ratios respectively increased to 78 percent 
and 71 percent in 2010. Further, among those with a positive spending on private tutoring, its share in the total 
education expenditure has also gone up slightly from 44 percent and 45 percent, respectively, for boys and girls 
in 1995 to 49 percent and 47 percent in 2010. Taken together, these show increasing dependency on private 
tutoring and increasing gender gap in the use of private tutoring, both in the intensive and extensive margins. 
Hence, parents are willing to invest more in children’s, particularly boys’, education for better quality of 
education beyond the basic educational costs like school fees.14 It is also notable that girls on average have lower 
spending on tuition and a significant share of children have zero spending on tuition (32 percent in 1995 and 46 
percent in 2010), which can be explained by the tuition waiver provided by various programs including the FSPs 
discussed in detail in Section  6. 
 
5 Contradirectional Gender Gap 
 
In this section, we document the persistent contradirectional gender gap using the three-part model developed 
in Section 3. We first present the ML estimates and then perform similar regressions under alternative 
specifications to show the robustness of our results. Finally, we compute the marginal effects of being a girl to 
provide estimates that have direct quantitative interpretations. 
 
Estimation of coefficients 
 
Table 4 presents the ML estimates of the coefficient on the girl dummy—the covariate of primary interest—in 
the three-part model for each year and for each of primary- and secondary-school age groups. Columns (1)-(3) 
are the estimates for the primary-school age group and columns (4)-(6) for the secondary-school age group. As 
the table shows, the significance of the gender gap for the primary age group is smaller both economically and 
statistically than that for the secondary-school age group, and thus we hereafter focus on the analysis of the 
secondary-school age group. While we allow for dependence in error terms, equation-by-equation regressions 
under the assumption that ρs are all zero yield similar results15 
Column (4) of Table 4 shows the presence of clear and strong profemale bias in the enrollment decision 
from the year 2000 onwards, after controlling for the observables discussed in Section 4. That 
14Of course, alternative interpretations are possible. For example, the increasing popularity of private tutoring may 
reflect the deteriorating quality in school education because of overcrowding of classrooms or teacher absenteeism (Banerjee 
and Duflo,2006). 
15The results are presented in Table 19 in Appendix F. 
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Table 4: ML estimation of the three-part model by years and age groups 
 
 
Primary-school age (6-10) Secondary-school age (11-15) 
 
 d Cond y Cond s  d Cond y Cond s  
Coef. (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
1995         
Girl -0.031 -0.013 -0.016  -0.001 -0.085*** 0.001  
 (0.036) (0.033) (0.012)  (0.042) (0.032) (0.032)  
Obs.  6485    5011   
2000         
Girl 0.061* -0.114*** 0.009  0.339*** -0.174*** -0.082***  
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.010)  (0.039) (0.049) (0.014)  
Obs.  5600    4878   
2005         
Girl 0.048 -0.076** -0.023**  0.291*** -0.154*** -0.071***  
 (0.035) (0.033) (0.009)  (0.034) (0.027) (0.012)  
Obs.  6481    5638   
2010         
Girl 0.134*** -0.066** -0.019*  0.289*** -0.131*** -0.067***  
 (0.032) (0.029) (0.010)  (0.033) (0.025) (0.009)  
Obs.  7272    6205   
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered at 
the household level are reported in parentheses. The estimation is based on the three-part model constructed in Section 
3. In all regressions, the following covariates are also included: logarithmic per capita expenditure, logarithmic 
household size, father’s and mother’s education in years, number of children, female head, wage-worker head, head’s age, 
and religion (muslim/hindu), urban area, and dummy variables for the child’s age. In addition, the school accessibility 
variables, school-types dummy variables (public/private), and logarithmic education expenditure are also included in 
the equations for xd, xy, and xs, respectively. Detailed results for secondary-school age group are presented in Table 
18 in Appendix F. 
 
is, other things being equal, parents are more likely to send girls to school than boys. Column (5) reveals that, 
conditional on enrollment, households spend significantly less on the secondary education of girls than that of 
boys in all the four survey rounds. Further, conditional on enrollment, the core component for girls tends to 
account for a lower share of the total education expenditure than that for boys as shown in column (6). Our 
analysis thus uncovers the presence of persistent contradirectional gender gap. 
Columns (4)-(6) of Table 4 also appears to indicate that the gender gap in 1995 is somewhat different from 
the three more recent rounds. While we still see a promale bias in the conditional education expenditure, the 
coefficient on the girl dummy is substantially smaller in absolute value in 1995. Furthermore, the estimated 
coefficients on the girl dummy in the enrollment and core share equations are insignificant. We attempt to 
explain this observation in Sections 6 and 7. 
Because the girl dummy is our main covariate of interest, we only presented its estimated coefficients in Table 
4. The complete results of the regressions for secondary-school age group in Table 4 can be found in Table 18 
in Appendix F. Here, we briefly summarize some notable findings about other 
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covariates of interest. In general, children in richer households are more likely to be enrolled in school and receive 
a higher expenditure on education but a lower core share. Parental education, especially mother’s education, has 
a qualitatively similar effect in all three decisions. The more educated parents are, the more likely children will 
enroll in school and the higher education expenditure they are likely to receive. In contrast, if the head is a wage 
worker, the child has a lower probability of enrollment but tends to receive a higher core share, except for the year 
1995, after controlling for various covariates. These points appear to suggest the presence of positive 
intergenerational transmission in education. Somewhat surprisingly, the number of children has no effect as its 
coefficient is mostly insignificant. 
Another notable finding is the relevance of the location of residence as well as school access and type. 
Children in rural areas are more likely to enroll in school but have a lower education expenditure conditional on 
enrollment, which may be a result of various aid programs targeted at rural areas. Table 18 also shows that 
children are more likely to enroll when the number of secondary schools per thousand people in the area of 
residence is higher. The coefficients on the school-type variables show that children going to private schools 
spend more on education than those going to public or other types of schools. 
 
Robustness Checks 
 
There is a potential endogeneity concern about the results in Table 4. To understand the endogeneity concern, 
recall from Table 2 that girls on average live in significantly larger households than boys. This may be explained 
by the fertility stopping rule with unobserved parental preference towards boys (Jensen,2002). If parents prefer to 
have a boy, they may continue to try to have more children until they have a boy. This will result in girls living in 
larger families than boys on average. Hence, the unobserved parental preference may simultaneously affect both 
the household’s demographic composition as well as the education expenditure on children such that the 
unobserved error terms may be correlated with the covariates. 
To partially address this concern, we include the household size and number of children in the set of 
covariates to control for the differences in the household composition in our regressions. However, these controls 
may not fully address the potential endogeneity concerns relating to the household composition. Therefore, as 
an alternative, we run linear regressions with household fixed effects to control for all household-level observable 
and unobservable characteristics in addition to the individual-level observable characteristics using a subsample of 
children from households with at least two children in the secondary-school age group. The signs of the coefficient 
on the girl dummy from these estimations are broadly consistent as Table 5 shows, though some coefficients are no 
longer statistically significant. 
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Table 5: Results of linear regressions with household-level fixed effects 
 
 
Coef.  d Cond y Cond s 
  (1) (2) (3) 
1995     
Girl  -0.006 -0.139* -0.014 
  (0.028) (0.076) (0.027) 
Obs  2,834 1,076 1,076 
HHs  1,298 713 713 
2000     
Girl  0.076*** -0.063 -0.043* 
  (0.028) (0.090) (0.025) 
Obs  2,695 1,015 1,015 
HHs  1,258 693 693 
2005     
Girl  0.098*** -0.032 -0.018 
  (0.028) (0.068) (0.015) 
Obs  2,587 1,084 1,084 
HHs  1,220 736 736 
2010     
Girl  0.095*** -0.078 -0.050*** 
  (0.031) (0.061) (0.019) 
Obs  2,551 1,220 1,220 
HHs  1,214 823 823 
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. Each point estimate corresponds to one linear regression. 
Household-level fixed-effects terms as well as the age fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
In addition, school-type variables (public/private) are included in the set of regressors in column 
(2) and the logarithmic education expenditure in column (3). All other covariates used in Table 4 
are absorbed in the household-level fixed effects. 
 
The lack of significance, however, can be attributed to the small size of the sample used in this analysis.  
       A related concern is that girls are likely to face a stiffer competition with siblings than boys because the former 
have more siblings than the latter on average. Therefore, our main results may be driven by the difference in the 
household competition between boys and girls. To address this concern, we also analyze a subsample of 
households in which there is only one child. This arguably mitigates the gender difference in the level of 
competition within the household. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 6. Because the sample size for 
this analysis is small, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions. Still, columns (1)-(3) of this table indicate that 
the contradirectional gender gap remains albeit weaker. 
          We also alternatively use a subsample of children living in households with one boy and one girl in 
secondary-school age group and run linear regressions with household-level fixed effects as reported in columns 
(4)-(6). Unlike columns (1)-(3), we are able to control for the household-level observable 
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Table 6: Linear regressions by subsamples with different household compositions 
 
 
Only Child One-boy-one-girl 
 
 d Cond y Cond s  d Cond y Cond s  
Coef. (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
1995         
Girl 0.023 0.097 -0.056*  0.010 -0.139 0.001  
 (0.052) (0.151) (0.032)  (0.033) (0.096) (0.041)  
Obs 314 113 113  1,076 423 423  
2000         
Girl 0.064 -0.130 -0.013  0.069** -0.135 -0.044  
 (0.052) (0.142) (0.038)  (0.032) (0.091) (0.029)  
Obs 286 108 108  1,146 447 447  
2005         
Girl 0.025 -0.129 -0.042  0.099*** -0.037 -0.022  
 (0.048) (0.095) (0.028)  (0.032) (0.077) (0.017)  
Obs 382 169 169  1,190 526 526  
2010         
Girl 0.040 -0.089 -0.046**  0.093*** -0.068 -0.054**  
 (0.038) (0.076) (0.018)  (0.035) (0.070) (0.022)  
Obs 580 305 305  1,086 510 510  
Basic covariates Y Y Y Ya Ya Ya 
HH fixed effects N N N Y Y Y 
a: The girl dummy and age fixed effects are included in columns (4)-(6). In addition, the school type 
dummy variables and logarithmic education expenditure are included, respectively, in columns (5) 
and (6). All other covariates are absorbed in the household-level fixed effects. 
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard 
errors clustered at household levels are reported in parentheses. The estimations are obtained by 
equation-by-equation OLS estimations for each dependent variable. Only child subsample contains 
children from the households with only one child. One-boy-one-girl subsample contains children from 
the households with exactly two children, one secondary-school age boy and one secondary-school 
age girl. 
 
and unobservable characteristics. Again, the statistical significance is weaker but broadly the signs are consistent 
with Table 4. Therefore, our results may be partly driven by intrahousehold competition, but it does not explain 
away all the contradirectional gender gap. 
Another potential concern about Table 4 is the definition of the secondary-school age. Because of grade 
repetition and delayed entry into school, some secondary-school age children may be still in primary school and 
some post-secondary-school age children may be still in secondary school. To see if the presence of these 
children affects our results, we re-estimate the same model with an alternative definition of age groups where 
primary- and secondary-school age groups are defined as 6-11 and 12-17, respectively. The results are 
quantitatively and qualitatively similar.16 
16Results are available upon request. 
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In addition, we also adopt some alternative specifications to better understand the contradirectional gender gap. 
First, the analysis of pooled sample with interaction terms between the girl dummy and time fixed effects 
indicates that the contradirectional gender gap did not change much over time (See Table 20 in Appendix F). We 
also conduct an analysis for urban and rural areas separately, because urban and rural areas are different in a 
variety of ways, including economic environment, labor market conditions, and societal attitudes towards female 
education. As detailed in Table 21 in Appendix F, the contradirectional gender gap is observed in both urban 
and rural areas and the gap in rural areas is generally larger in magnitude than that in urban areas. 
 
Marginal Effects 
 
Our regression coefficients from the three-part model do not provide readily interpretable quantities. Hence, we 
evaluate the marginal effect of being a girl at the sample mean, using the formula presented at the end of Section 
3. The estimated marginal effects are presented in Table 7. Column (1) shows the presence of a significant 
profemale bias in the probability of enrollment except in 1995. For example, girls are 11.6 percentage points 
more likely to enroll in secondary schools than boys at the sample mean in 2010. The effects of being a girl on the 
total education expenditure and core expenditure conditional on enrollment are shown, respectively, in columns 
(3) and (5). Therefore, if we focus on school enrollees, girls enjoy less education expenditure and lower core share 
than boys. 
For example, column (3) shows that the gender difference in the total education expenditure in 2005 was 416.6 
BDT at the mean of the subsample of secondary school enrollees. Similarly, there exists a significant promale 
bias in the core component expenditure from 2000 onwards. However, as shown in column (2), when we consider 
the combined effect of enrollment and conditional expenditure, girls actually have a higher unconditional education 
expenditure than boys except for the year 1995. Further, the gender gap in the unconditional core expenditure is 
negligible as column (4) shows. These observations highlight the importance of clearly distinguishing the 
conditional and unconditional expectations. 
The results above consistently show that girls received less expenditure in the core component than boys 
conditional on enrollment, and this gender gap grew over time. To identify the source of this growing gap, we 
computed the marginal effect of being a girl at the sample mean for the secondary school enrollees using the 
estimates from item-by-item Tobit regressions. The results of this analysis presented in Table 22 of Appendix F 
show that girls receive significantly less investment in tuition than boys for all the survey years. Girls also 
receive less in private tutoring, though the differences are not always significant. On the other hand, the only 
item for which girls somewhat consistently receive a higher amount is uniform, but this difference does not make 
up for the disadvantages in other 
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Table 7: Marginal effects of the girl dummy at the sample mean 
 
 
Marginal effects E(d) E(y) E(y|d = 1) E(ys) E(ys|d = 1) 
at the sample mean (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1995 -0.001 -40.5 -181.9*** -7.8 -110.5 
 (0.016) (26.3) (67.7) (16.3) (92.7) 
Obs. 5011 5011 1798 5011 1798 
2000 0.126*** 152.5*** -224.7*** 11.5 -312.7*** 
 (0.014) (29.8) (76.3) (24.6) (62.5) 
Obs. 4878 4878 1885 4878 1885 
2005 0.114*** 145.6*** -416.6*** -0.4 -367.3*** 
 (0.014) (47.6) (80.8) (40.3) (56.6) 
Obs. 5638 5638 2579 5638 2579 
2010 0.116*** 313.0*** -616.8*** 3.2 -604.9*** 
 (0.014) (80.6) (146.7) (51.7) (98.7) 
Obs. 6205 6205 3172 6205 3172 
Note: ∗∗∗,∗∗ , and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors in 
parentheses are obtained by simulation with 100 replications (see Appendix B for details).  
E( ·) stands for the expectation operator. Estimates in column (1) are the marginal effect of the girl dummy on 
the expected enrollment in secondary school for the children in the secondary-school age group. The marginal 
effects presented in Columns (2) to (5) are in BDT in nominal terms. Unconditional [Conditional] expectations 
are evaluated at the mean of the full sample [subsample of secondary school enrollees]. 
 
expenditure items. Therefore, girls have overall lower education expenditure and lower core expenditure 
conditional on enrollment and this female disadvantage mainly comes from tuition and private tutoring. 
 
6 Analyzing the Role of FSPs 
 
The contradirectional gender gap reported in the previous section is unique to Bangladesh and deserves further 
investigation. We conjecture that the FSPs may have played a role here for two reasons. First, the FSPs would 
encourage girls’ school enrollment but may not necessarily affect the total education expenditure and core share 
conditional on enrollment. Second, India and Pakistan, which did not have a nationwide program similar to the 
FSPs, exhibit a clear codirectional promale bias. 
We start with a brief background of the FSPs. Then, we provide supporting evidence for the relevance of the 
FSPs to the contradirectional gender gap in four different ways. First, we focus on the impact of the FSPs on the 
quantity measures of education by the double difference approach as this analysis provides relatively cleaner 
identification. Then, we incorporate in the three-part model the individual status of being an FSP recipient and 
the girl recipient ratio (GRR), which is defined as the number of the FSP recipients over the total number of 
girls of the same age in the division of residence and interpreted as a measure of the FSP intensity. Third, 
because the core share may 
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be directly affected by the tuition waiver awarded to the FSP recipients, we mute its effect by either excluding 
the tuition from the analysis or imputing the tuition for FSP recipients. Finally, we analyze the gender gap in the 
educational outcome using the timely graduation from a secondary school as an outcome indicator. 
 
Background of FSPs 
 
The FSPs, which started as a small pilot program in 1982 and rolled out nationwide in 1994, consist of the 
following four projects: 1) the Female Secondary School Assistance Project, 2) the Female Secondary Stipend 
Project, 3) the Secondary Education Development Project, and 4) the Female Secondary Education Project. 
These projects are similar except that their funding agencies and the locations of operation differ. FSPs’ target 
population is unmarried girls studying in secondary schools outside of the metropolitan areas that have signed a 
participation agreement. At the entry grades (grades 6 and 9), all female students in participating schools are 
eligible to benefit from the FSPs regardless of past attendance or performance. However, the following three 
conditions must be maintained for the continuation of the program: i) attending at least 75 percent of the school 
days, ii) achieving minimum marks of 45 percent in the annual school examination, and iii) staying unmarried 
until the SSC examination. The stipends are disbursed in two equal installments per academic year and the 
amount increases with the grade progression. The FSP recipients are also entitled to enjoy free tuition and schools 
are directly paid by the FSPs. However, around 15 percent of the FSP recipients, including both private- and 
public-school children, pay a small amount for tuition fee in our data. The FSPs’ financial assistance is designed 
to cover slightly less than half of expenditure for secondary education.17 
The nationwide rollout of FSPs took place rapidly between 1994 and 1995. According to BANBEIS (2006), 
the number of FSP recipients was only 70 thousand in 1994. The number jumped to 1.4 million in 1995 and more 
than doubled in the following two years. It continued to increase rapidly until reaching its peak of 4.2 million in 
2002 after which it dropped to 2.3 million in 2005. These numbers are sizable both in absolute terms and relative 
to the cohort size (17.3 million in 2005) and the total enrollment (7.4 million in 2005) for the secondary-school 
age group. 
However, with the intention of improving the quality of education and reaching out to the poor regardless of 
the gender, the FSPs were subsequently replaced by the Secondary Education Quality and 
17The monthly stipend amount starts from 25 BDT for grade 6 and reaches 60 BDT for grade 10, The tuition fee paid 
under FSPs also increases from 10 BDT per month in grade 6 to 15 BDT per month in grade 10 for public schools, and the 
amount is higher for private schools by 5 BDT per month. In addition, the book allowance and examination fee are given 
to the grades 9 and 10 recipients, respectively. See also Table 2 of Bangladesh Ministry of Education (1996) for further 
details of the FSPs. 
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Access Enhancement Program (SEQAEP) in 2008, which targeted the poor in remote subdistricts in Bangladesh. 
Thus, the FSPs are relevant only to the early three rounds of our analysis, namely 1995, 2000, and 2005, whereas 
the SEQAEP was in place by 2010. 
Because of the lack of clarity in the way the resources for the FSPs were allocated and because of the lack 
of information on the individual FSP eligibility in our dataset, our analysis is necessarily based on the actual 
receipt of the program. Along with this problem, it is also difficult to obtain a clean identification of the impacts 
of the FSPs for two additional reasons. First, the assignment of FSPs is nonrandom as there are some eligibility 
criteria. Second, we have limited data before the national rollout of the FSPs. In particular, the individual-level 
information on education expenditure is only available from the year 1995 when the FSPs were already available 
nationwide. Therefore, we start the analysis of the FSPs with quantity measures of education to enable a 
(relatively) clean identification through a double difference approach. 
 
Impact of the FSPs on the Quantity of Education 
 
In this subsection, we focus on the impact of the FSPs on two quantity measures of education. The first quantity 
measure of education is the completed years of education (YrEduih) for each working-age individual i between 
19 and 65 years of age in each household h for each HIES survey round. The second analysis of a quantity 
measure of education is based on the retrospective panel data on enrollment (Enrolliht) for each child i in 
household h in calendar year t. The retrospective panel data is created under the assumptions that each child 
enters secondary school (grade 6) at the stipulated secondary-school entry age of age 11 and that no child repeats 
a grade.18 Then, we go back the calendar year to determine whether the child was in school. As an example, 
consider a boy who is 17 years old in 2005. If he completed grade 8, the last age at which he was in school 
would be 13. Therefore, he was in a secondary school between 1999 and 2001 (ages 11-13) and out of school 
between 2002 and 2005 (ages 14-17). We do this for all individuals born in or after 1949 in each round of HIES 
survey up to 2007, and focus on the records that correspond to the secondary-school ages of 11-15, such that the 
calendar year for the analysis starts from 1960(=1949+11).19 
We estimate the impacts of the FSPs on these quantity measures by double difference regressions, where one 
difference is taken between the two genders and the other between those who are covered and not covered by the 
FSPs. Specifically, we obtain from Table 3 of Shamsuddin(2015, p. 432) the year in which each subdistrict was 
covered by an FSP and use it to determine the FSP coverage (FSPCover), 
18According to BANBEIS(1995,2010), the repetition rate was around 5 percent and 4 percent in years 1995 and 2010, 
respectively. 
Thus, our nonrepetition assumption serves as a reasonable approximation. 
19We followed Heath and Mobarak(2015) to determine the starting year of our study period. The results remain similar 
even when we shift the starting year to 1980. 
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or whether an individual is in a subdistrict covered by an FSP in the reference year. Here, the reference year is 
year t [the calendar year in which the child is at age 11] for the regression of Enroll [YrEdu]. The construction 
of FSPCover is based on the assumption that the location of individuals does not change over time and this is a 
reasonable approximation, because the migration rate is low, especially early years, in Bangladesh. Since the 
rollout of the FSPs is plausibly exogenous and all unobservable time-invariant household effects are controlled 
for, the double difference approach substantially reduces the endogeneity concerns. 
To be specific, the following double difference specifications are used: 
 
𝑌𝑟𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖ℎ = 𝛼1𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖ℎ + 𝛼2𝐹𝑆𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖ℎ + 𝛼3𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖ℎ × 𝐹𝑆𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖ℎ 
 +∑𝑏 𝜇𝑏 × 𝟏(𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖ℎ = 𝑏) + 𝜃ℎ + 𝜀𝑖ℎ, (5) 
 and 
 𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼1𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖ℎ + 𝛼2𝐹𝑆𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖ℎ𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖ℎ × 𝐹𝑆𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖ℎ𝑡 
 +∑15𝑎=11 𝛽𝑎 × 𝟏(𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 𝑎) + ∑𝑏 𝜇𝑏 × 𝟏(𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖ℎ = 𝑏) + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜃ℎ + 𝜀𝑖ℎ𝑡,(6) 
 
where µb , βa, λt, and θh represent, respectively, birth year-, age-, time-, and household-specific fixed effects. ε 
is the idiosyncratic error term. 
Table 8 shows the OLS regression results of the two equations above. Panel A reports the regressions of the 
FSP coverage on the completed years of education for working-age individuals for each survey round, where 
the mean of the dependent variable for a given round is reported in the last row. Because the overwhelming 
majority (99.7 percent) of the working age adults in 1995 were not covered by the FSPs, it is not surprising that 
the impact of the FSPs on the years of completed education is insignificant (columns (1)). In the later rounds when 
the FSPs started to rapidly roll out nationwide, the years of schooling increased significantly for girls who were 
eligible for the FSPs at age 11. Column (4) shows that the promale gender gap in the years of education narrowed 
by 1.88 years after the FSPs rolled out in 2010. 
Panel B presents the regression of the enrollment status for the secondary school children aged between 11 
and 15. The first row indicates that the girls are less likely to be in secondary school than boys by 15-18 
percentage points across years, but the FSPs had a significantly positive impact and indeed more than offset this 
negative effect of being a girl after 2000 as the third row shows. For example, column (4) shows that the positive 
impact of the FSPs on enrollment was 19.1 percentage 
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Table 8: Impacts of the FSPs on the quantity measures of education 
 
HES 1995 HIES 2000 HIES 2005 HIES 2010 
 
Coef. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Years of education 
Girl -1.977*** 
(0.041) 
-1.863*** 
(0.040) 
-1.943*** 
(0.038) 
-2.000*** 
(0.042) 
FSPCover 0.667 -1.714*** -0.245 -0.358 
 (0.807) (0.368) (0.481) (0.562) 
Girl × FSPCover -0.390 
(1.123) 
1.661*** 
(0.179) 
1.775*** 
(0.104) 
1.876*** 
(0.084) 
Obs 
Mean of dep. var. 
18,303 
3.460 
18,828 
3.607 
24,912 
4.193 
29,519 
4.410 
     
Panel B: Enrollment using retrospective data 
Girl -0.148*** 
(0.004) 
-0.164*** 
(0.004) 
-0.172*** 
(0.004) 
-0.176*** 
(0.004) 
FSPCover -0.049 -0.175*** -0.065 -0.045 
Girl × FSPCover 
(0.044) 
0.131*** 
(0.012) 
(0.043) 
0.175*** 
(0.009) 
(0.049) 
0.188*** 
(0.007) 
(0.054) 
0.191*** 
(0.007) 
Obs 
Mean of dep. var. 
102,319 
0.265 
110,469 
0.279 
150,518 
0.319 
162,056 
0.335 
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. In Panel A, we 
additionally include the fixed-effects terms specific to the birth year and household. In 
Panel B, we additionally include the fixed-effects terms specific to the birth year, age at the 
time of observation, household, and year of observation. 
 
points, reversing a promale gap of 17.1 percentage points to a significant profemale gap of 1.5(=19.1-17.6) 
percentage points with a t-statistic of 7.2. These figures are both statistically and economically significant. 
The double difference specification significantly reduces the endogeneity concerns, because it is immune to 
selection on time-invariant household characteristics. However, one might argue that the rollout of the FSPs is 
not random. That is, the government and donors may have chosen to start the program in places where the promale 
gender bias is most prevalent. Nevertheless, the contamination from the selection of program areas is unlikely to 
be serious, because the coverage of FSPs was highly limited before 199420 and it expanded rapidly in 1994. Put 
differently, our identification is primarily through the interaction between the girl dummy and cohorts born after 
1983(=1994-11) and not through the differences in timing in the implementation of the FSPs across subdistricts. 
Further, we have conducted a falsification test to boost the credibility of the discussion above. In this test, we 
focus on 
20For example, among the working adults aged between 19 to 65 years in 2010, only 2 percent of the FSP coverage come 
from the pre-1994 period. 
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the period in which FSPs were not introduced and re-estimate the impact of FSPs by hypothetically shifting the 
introduction of the FSPs in each subdistrict earlier by five years (thus, for a majority of subdistricts, we pretend 
that the FSP coverage started in 1989 instead of in 1994). As expected, the impact of FSP coverage in the 
falsification test was found to be small in absolute value and statistically insignificant, as detailed in Appendix D. 
It should also be noted that our finding of the positive impact of the FSPs on enrollment is in line with 
existing studies (Khandker et al.,2003; Schurmann,2009; Asadullah and Chaudhury,2009; Shamsuddin,2015). 
However, it is notably at odds with Heath and Mobarak (2015, hereafter HM), who found no evidence that the 
FSPs have a positive impact on female enrollment. Instead, they found that what led to an improvement in female 
secondary education—in their study areas—was an increasing demand for female labor. 
Their analysis is based on a triple difference approach, where the primary school children are used as a 
comparison group in addition to the two differences (i.e., difference between the two genders and the difference 
between before and after the coverage by the FSPs) we take in our double difference estimation discussed above. 
Thus, to understand the source of the difference from HM clearly, we also conducted a triple difference analysis. 
We first replicated their results and progressively changed some elements of their analysis, including the data, the 
subdistricts studied, and the definitions of the FSP coverage and eligibility criterion. This exercise, detailed in 
Appendix E, shows that the HM’s findings seem to be driven by a combination of the particular data they used, 
geographic coverage of their data, and the FSP eligibility criterion used in their study. In particular, their FSP 
eligibility criterion of at least 6 years of schooling appears to have led to an underestimation of the FSPs’ impact 
on enrollment. This is because those girls who have completed a primary school are eligible for the FSPs if they 
go to a secondary school, such that girls who are in grade 6 (and thus not yet completed 6 years of schooling) are 
already able to benefit from the FSPs. Our preferred estimate of the FSPs’ impact on enrollment within the 
framework of the triple difference estimation, which uses the nationally representative HIES data and the 
completion of primary school as the eligibility criterion for the FSPs, shows that the FSPs’ impact on enrollment 
is positive and statistically significant. 
 
Incorporating the FSPs in the three-part model 
 
To have a more comprehensive understanding of the FSPs impact on education expenditure, we now incorporate 
the FSPs in the three-part model using the HIES data for the years 2000 and 2005 as they contain information 
on the individual status of the receipt of FSPs.21 This is important, because 
21HES 1995 does not contain the information on the FSP status. HIES 2010 was also not used because the FSPs 
were already terminated by then. It should also be noted that the HIES 2000 dataset appears to underrepresent the 
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Table 9: Three-part model estimation with the FSP status 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.315) (0.233) (0.081) 
 
Note: ∗∗∗,∗∗ , and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard 
errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. Girl recipient ratio (GRR) is the 
ratio of girl recipients to all girls for a given age group in a given division. The covariates discussed 
in Table 4 are also included in all regressions. 
 
the education expenditure of the FSP recipients is affected by the tuition waiver and stipend provided by the 
FSPs. Thus, we include the dummy variable for the FSP recipients, who are all girls, in the conditional 
expenditure and core share equations. 
The regression results are reported in columns (1)-(3) of Table 9. As the comparison with Table 4 shows, the 
inclusion of the FSP dummy makes the coefficients on the girl dummy in the conditional expenditure and core 
share equations even more negative. The point estimates on the FSP dummy are positive in the conditional 
expenditure equation, while they are significantly negative in the core share equation for both years. 
To understand where this impact is coming from, we report in Table 23 in Appendix F the marginal effects 
using item-by-item Tobit regressions that include both the girl and FSP-recipient dummy variables. This analysis 
shows that the FSP recipients spend less on tuition as expected, because the tuition is waived for the FSP recipients. 
The FSP recipients receive more expenditure on private tutoring and materials than non-recipients, but this 
positive effect of the FSPs does not offset the negative effect of 
FSP recipients. Based on BANBEIS(2006), the ratio of the number of FSP recipients to the number of female enrolled 
secondary school students is 86 percent, while the figure directly derived from the HIES 2000 data is 59 percent. Therefore, 
the interpretation of the results for the year 2000 requires some caution. This issue does not exist for the year 2005. 
Year Coef. d Cond y Cond s  d Cond y Cond s  
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Girl 0.339*** -0.245*** -0.062***  0.228** -0.236*** -0.018  
  (0.039) (0.054) (0.019)  (0.091) (0.085) (0.028)  
 FSP  0.123** -0.034**   0.149*** -0.037**  
2000   (0.049) (0.015)   (0.051) (0.017)  
 GRR     0.769** -1.299*** 0.247**  
      (0.346) (0.297) (0.121)  
 Girl × GRR 
Obs. 
  
 
4878 
  0.378 
(0.286) 
-0.100 
(0.260) 
4878 
-0.138* 
(0.078) 
 
 Girl 0.289*** -0.178*** -0.058*** 0.110 -0.107 -0.007 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.014) (0.093) (0.072) (0.025) 
 FSP  0.046 -0.026***  0.075** -0.025*** 
2005   (0.036) (0.009)  (0.036) (0.010) 
 GRR    0.470 -1.004*** 0.020 
     (0.306) (0.227) (0.093) 
 Girl × GRR    0.656** -0.308 -0.184** 
 
Obs. 
 
5638 
   
5638 
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being a girl. Thus, the recipients of the FSPs still do not enjoy as much core education expenditure as boys. For 
the peripheral items, FSP recipients get a higher expenditure in most items, especially in uniform, meals, and 
transportation, with a notable exception of admission. Overall, this analysis indicates that the FSPs did not 
increase the core expenditure among school enrollees. 
Next, we study the spillover effect of FSPs by exploiting the variations across regions and ages in the 
intensity of FSPs as measured by the GRR. In columns (4)-(6) of Table 9, we report the results of the three-part 
model estimation that includes as covariates the GRR and its interaction with the girl dummy in addition to all 
the covariates used in columns (1)-(3) of the same table. These results show that girls living in more FSP-
intensive divisions (for their age) are more likely to be enrolled in school. This indicates that FSPs may have a 
positive spillover effect on families living in the same area such that parents are more likely to enroll their 
children, particularly daughters, in school. However, there is no evidence that FSPs facilitate parental investment 
in the quality of education for girls. The coefficient on the interaction terms in the conditional education 
expenditure is negative for both 2000 and 2005, and the same coefficient in the conditional core share equation 
is significantly negative in both years. 
We also investigate the spillover effect of FSPs on boys’ education expenditure. Due to the non-random 
assignment of FSPs and the limited data of pre-FSPs period, clean identification is difficult. Nevertheless, we 
provide some supporting evidence of the spillover impact of the FSPs by comparing education expenditure of 
boys from households with and without a FSP recipient. We estimate the three-part model with a subsample of 
boys. As the results reported in Table 10 show, boys from a FSP-receiving household (FSP HH), or a household 
with at least one FSP recipient, are more likely to enroll in school than boys from a household without a FSP 
recipient. However, conditional on enrollment, they receive less education expenditure than boys from non-FSP 
households, though there is no significant difference in core share. This indicates that there is positive spillover 
effects on boys’ enrollment status, even though we cannot exclude the possibility that this is driven by the 
unobserved heterogeneity between FSP-receiving and non FSP-receiving households. On the other hand, the 
negative spillover effects of the FSPs on boys’ education expenditure conditional on enrollment suggest that 
households with FSP recipients may shift education expenditure from boys to girls. Thus, between the income 
effect of the FSPs through stipend and the substitution effect due to the lower relative price of girls’ education, 
the former appears to dominate the latter, even though such an interpretation requires caution due to the 
nonrandom assignment of the FSPs. 
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Table 10: Three-part model estimation with a subsample of boys 
 
 
  HIES2000    HIES2005   
d cond y cond s  d cond y cond s 
Coef. (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: All boys 
FSP HH 0.138 -0.215** -0.000 0.300*** -0.156** -0.054* 
 (0.101) (0.087) (0.028) (0.104) (0.067) (0.029) 
Obs  2,488   2,848  
Panel B: Boys in one-boy-one girl households 
FSP HH 0.264* -0.200* 0.054 0.416*** -0.192* -0.049 
 (0.159) (0.114) (0.067) (0.133) (0.114) (0.039) 
Obs  573   595  
Note: ∗∗∗,∗∗ , and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors 
clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. The estimates are obtained using the three-part model 
constructed in Section 3. The covariates discussed in Table 4 are also included in all regressions. 
 
Muting the FSPs Tuition Waiver 
 
As mentioned above, the tuition waiver is an important component of the FSPs. The tuition waiver encourages 
enrollment but also tends to negatively affect the conditional expenditure and core share among the school 
enrollees. However, the latter negative effects may be spurious. This may be simply because the FSPs are 
replacing the household’s tuition expenditure for girls through the tuition waiver; the FSPs might not have any 
impact on the conditional expenditure and core share once the tuition waiver is taken into consideration. 
To see if this is a possible explanation, we attempt to mute the impact of the tuition waiver through two 
alternative empirical exercises: exclusion and imputation. In the exclusion exercise, we exclude the tuition fee 
from the calculations of both the total education expenditure and core expenditure. In the imputation exercise, 
we impute the tuition fee for the FSP recipients using a linear prediction model. Then, the imputed tuition fee is 
computed by predicting the fee with the estimated parameter values but omitting the term involving the FSP-
recipient dummy. This predicted amount, which is truncated from below at zero, can be interpreted as the tuition 
fee parents would have to spend had their daughter not received a tuition waiver. 
The results of these two exercises are presented in Table 11 together with the baseline estimates taken from 
Table 4 for the ease of comparison. As the table shows, the absolute value of the coefficient on the girl dummy 
becomes smaller than the baseline results in each of the three equations after turning off the impact of tuition waiver 
either by exclusion or imputation. This indicates that our finding is indeed driven in part by the spurious effect 
coming from the tuition waiver. However, as Table 11 shows, the sign and statistical significance of the 
coefficient on the girl dummy remain the same. Therefore, 
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Table 11: Three-part model estimation with the impact of the tuition waiver muted 
 
 
Year Model d Cond y Cond s 
 Baseline 0.339*** -0.174*** -0.082*** 
  (0.039) (0.049) (0.014) 
2000 Exclusion 0.322*** -0.081* -0.062*** 
  (0.039) (0.045) (0.013) 
 Imputation 0.324*** -0.072 -0.055*** 
  (0.039) (0.047) (0.011) 
 Baseline 0.291*** -0.154*** -0.071*** 
  (0.034) (0.027) (0.012) 
2005 Exclusion 0.274*** -0.079*** -0.058*** 
  (0.035) (0.028) (0.011) 
 Imputation 0.279*** -0.106*** -0.050*** 
  (0.035) (0.028) (0.010) 
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard 
errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. Additional covariates discussed in Table 
4 are also included. The baseline results are taken from Table 4. In the exclusion exercise, tuition fee is 
excluded from both total education expenditure and core expenditures to compute s. In the imputation 
exercise, we instead impute the tuition fee for FSP recipients using the predicted value from a linear mode 
estimated with the pooled sample that include the fixed-effects terms for the following categorical 
variables: enrollment status, FSP-recipient status, district of residence, survey year, gender, and school 
type (private/public). 
 
the earlier finding of the contradirectional gender gap still remains valid even after muting the effects of tuition 
waiver. 
Since Table 11 does not distinguish girls by the FSP-recipient status, we also consider a model that 
incorporates the FSP status in the three-part model and mute the effects of tuition waiver. In the top panel of 
Table 12, we present the baseline estimation of the three-part model with the FSP status reported in Table 9. 
Then, as with Table 11, we mute the effects of tuition wavier by either exclusion or imputation. 
As Table 12 shows, FSP girls enjoy a higher total education expenditure than non-FSP girls even in the 
baseline results, and the difference becomes more significant, both economically and statistically, once the effects 
of tuition waiver are muted. By comparing the signs and sizes of the coefficients on FSP and Girl, it can also be 
seen that the positive impacts of the FSPs can substantially mitigate the promale bias in the total education 
expenditure (conditional on enrollment). Nevertheless, there is no significant difference in the core share by the 
FSP status and girls receive significantly lower core share than boys. Taken together, FSPs did not appear to 
remove the gender gap in the education expenditure on the core component conditional on enrollment. 
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Table 12: Three-part model estimation with FSP status after muting the tuition waiver 
 
  HIES2000    HIES2005   
d cond y cond s  d cond y cond s 
Baseline         
Girl 0.339*** -0.245*** -0.062***  0.289*** -0.178*** -0.058***  
 (0.039) (0.054) (0.019)  (0.034) (0.034) (0.014)  
FSP  0.123** -0.034**   0.046 -0.026***  
  (0.049) (0.015)   (0.036) (0.009)  
Exclusion         
Girl 0.323*** -0.191*** -0.052***  0.273*** -0.128*** -0.050***  
 (0.039) (0.053) (0.018)  (0.035) (0.035) (0.013)  
FSP  0.192*** -0.018   0.097*** -0.016  
  (0.050) (0.018)   (0.036) (0.011)  
Imputation         
Girl 0.327*** -0.228*** -0.055***  0.281*** -0.178*** -0.051***  
 (0.039) (0.053) (0.017)  (0.035) (0.034) (0.013)  
FSP  0.288*** 0.002   0.147*** 0.002  
  (0.047) (0.019)   (0.036) (0.011)  
Note: ∗∗∗,∗∗ , and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered at 
the household level are reported in parentheses. The estimations are obtained using the three-part model constructed in 
Section 3. In all regressions, the following covariates are also included: logarithmic per capita expenditure, logarithmic 
household size, father’s and mother’s education in years, number of children, female head, wage-worker head, head’s age, 
and religion (muslim/hindu), urban area, and dummy variables for the child’s age. In addition, the school accessibility 
variables, school-types dummy variables (private/public), and logarithmic education expenditure are also included in the 
equations for xd, xy, and xs, respectively. Baseline results are taken from Table 9. See the tables note for Table 11for the 
details of the exclusion and imputation exercises. 
 
Impact on Timely Secondary School Graduation 
 
The results of the previous subsections suggest that the FSPs promoted the girls’ enrollment in secondary 
schools but fell short of reducing the gender gap in the investment in the quality of education. Indeed, the FSPs 
have been criticized for the lack of attention to the quality of education (Mahmud, 2003; Raynor and Wesson, 
2006). Our analysis highlights the reason why the quality of education for girls lag behind that for boys among 
the school enrollees from the perspective of complementary investment in education from households. 
Nevertheless, it is not evident from the preceding analysis how this has affected the performance of girls in 
school relative to boys. Unfortunately, our data do not contain standard performance measures of education such 
as test scores. Therefore, we use completion of secondary school (roughly) on time as an indicator of education 
performance. This is a reasonable indicator because passing the SSC examination requires a certain level of 
mastery of the secondary-level curriculum.22 Based on our age group classification, a child is regarded to have 
completed secondary school (roughly) on time if he/she has already passed at least grade 10 (SSC or equivalent) 
when he/she is in age range16-20. For this exercise, 
22To complete secondary education, the child has to pass the SSC exam. As shown in Figure 1, the passing rate varies 
and may be as low as 40 percent depending on the year. Thus, passing the SSC examination is not trivial. 
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Table 13: OLS regressions of on-time secondary school completion by year 
 
 
Sec complete on time 1991 1995 2000 2005 2010 2005 2010 
Coef. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: All individuals aged 16-20 
Girl -0.043*** -0.053*** -0.043*** -0.014 -0.005 0.004 0.065** 
 
Lagged GRR 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.020) 
0.242*** 
(0.091) 
(0.027) 
0.699*** 
(0.091) 
Girl×Lagged GRR      -0.064 
(0.070) 
-0.261*** 
(0.094) 
Obs 3,043 3,752 3,988 5,055 5,316 5,055 5,316 
Panel B: All primary graduates aged 16-20 
Girl -0.019 -0.081*** -0.063*** -0.022* -0.024* 0.032 0.088*** 
Lagged GRR 
Girl×Lagged GRR 
(0.027) (0.019) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.027) 
0.345*** 
(0.122) 
-0.201** 
(0.094) 
(0.033) 
0.835*** 
(0.115) 
-0.425*** 
(0.116) 
Obs 1,223 2,113 2,621 3,716 4,089 3,716 4,089 
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors 
clustered at household level are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for the 
completion of secondary school on time, which takes one if an individual aged between 16 and 20 at the time of 
survey had already completed grade 10 or higher. Lagged GRR is the GRR at division-age level five years before 
the survey. In 2005 [2010], we use GRR for the year 2000 [2005]. In all regressions, the following covariates are 
also included: logarithmic expenditure per capita, logarithmic household size, the dummy variables for the 
household heads’ education level (primary, secondary and higher), female head, wage-worker head, head’s age 
and religion (muslim/hindu), urban area, and dummy variables for the child’s age. Panel A uses a sample of all 
individuals aged between 16 and 20 and Panel B uses a subsample of primary graduates among them. 
 
we additionally use HES 1991 dataset as it contains information necessary to construct the indicator for 
completion on time. 
In columns (1)-(5) of Panel A of  Table 13, we report the estimated effects of being a girl on timely 
completion of secondary school for each survey year through OLS regressions. The effects have become less 
promale and the beginning of the narrowing of the gap roughly corresponds to the onset of the FSPs, which 
seems to indicate that FSPs helped close the gender gap in timely completion of secondary education. 
However, if we restrict the sample to those who have already completed primary education, the picture looks 
different as the columns (1)-(5) in Panel B of Table 13 show. The gender gap in the timely completion of 
secondary education conditional on the completion of primary education is larger than that in the unconditional 
sample—except for the year 1991 when the FSPs were yet to be rolled 
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out nationwide. This indicates that the narrowing of gender gap observed in Panel A may be due to the 
improvement in girls’ secondary enrollment. That is, if more girls are enrolled, they have a higher unconditional 
probability of completion. However, the results of panel B indicate that the school performance of girls among 
the potential school enrollees, or those who have completed primary school, was worse than that of boys. 
Assuming that the gender gap in the quality of education translates into the gender gap in school performance, 
the result above are consistent with our finding above that the quality of education for girls conditional on 
enrollment consistently lagged behind that for boys. 
Next, we attempt to understand the impact of the FSPs on the timely graduation from secondary school. This 
is challenging, because we do not have the history of the FSP-recipient status in the past. Instead, we include in 
the regressions the lagged FSP intensity—as measured by GRR five years prior to the survey—and its interaction 
with the girl dummy. That is, we use the GRR for the year 2000 [2005] and its interaction term in the analysis of 
timely graduation in the year 2005 [2010]. The lagged variable would arguably reflect the cumulative impact of 
the FSPs in the last five years. Note, however, that the results for the year 2010 suffer from the contamination of 
the sample because some of the individuals in the sample may have benefitted from the SEQAEP. 
The results of this analysis are presented in columns (6)-(7) of Table 13. For all children aged between 16 
and 20, girls living in more FSP-intensive areas are less likely to graduate on time than boys as the negative 
point estimates on the interaction term (i.e., Girl × Lagged GRR) indicate. When we look only at the subsample 
of those who have completed primary education, the promale gender gap is significant in more FSPs intensive 
areas. Thus, consistent with our earlier findings, there is no evidence that the FSPs improved the quality of 
education for secondary school girls relative to boys. If anything, the girls in high FSP-intensive areas are less 
likely to graduate from secondary school on time than the girls in low FSP-intensive areas, indicating the impact 
of the FSPs on the performance in secondary school was possibly negative. 
In sum, these preceding analyses collectively indicate two points. First, the FSPs increased the female 
secondary school enrollment and years of education. Second, despite the increase in these quantity measures of 
education, the FSPs did not attract complementary investment in the quality of education from the households. 
As a result, the quality and performance of education for girls appears to have lagged behind those for boys 
among school enrollees. 
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7 Diagrammatic Analysis and Labor Market Returns 
 
While the girls’ secondary school enrollment rate has substantially increased over the last decades both in terms of 
the absolute level and relative to the boys’ in Bangladesh, the findings so far demonstrate that girls lagged behind 
boys in the performance of education likely because of the lack of complementary spending from households in 
the quality of education. Therefore, even though the FSPs have been successful in eliminating the gender gap in 
enrollment, they did not remove the gap in education quality once girls are in school. In this section, we offer a 
simple demand-supply diagram for the market of education quality for the secondary school children to explain 
why the FSPs do not necessarily change the promale gender gap in the expenditure on the quality of education. 
We then explore the relevance of gender difference in the labor market returns to our findings. 
We start with a simple demand and supply diagram for the market of education quality in Figure 3. While we 
abstract away from the details about what constitutes education quality in this analysis, it can be considered as 
private tutoring for the ease of understanding. The black solid line in the figure represents the supply of the 
education quality. The demand curves for girls and boys are shown in solid red and blue lines, respectively. In 
this figure, the demand for girls is always lower than that for boys, representing promale bias in the market for 
education quality. The aggregate demand is the kinked line in purple. 
The diagram is somewhat similar to Dang and Rogers (2015), who include private tutoring into the analysis 
of education in Vietnam. However, our diagram is distinct in two important aspects. First, the decision to enroll 
is a trivial decision in Vietnam as most children go to school and thus enrollment decision is not separately 
considered,23 whereas secondary school enrollment remains an important household decision in Bangladesh. 
Second, we also explicitly distinguish between boys and girls and use the diagram to analyze the impact of the 
FSPs. 
In Figure 3, the equilibrium price is given by (the length of) OA and equilibrium demand for the boys and 
girls are AB and BC, respectively. In the standard framework of economic analysis, the FSPs would be expected 
to reduce the cost of sending children to school, which may in turn lead to an increase in the complementary 
demand for the education quality, shifting the demand curve for the girls to the dashed red line. Then, the lower 
part of the aggregate demand curve will also shift to the dashed purple line. In this case, the demand for the 
quality of education by girls will increase to DE, whereas that by boys will decrease to EF. The demand for the 
education quality for boys decreases because of the higher equilibrium price resulting from higher competing 
demands from girls. Hence, in 
23Dang and Rogers (2015) report that 87 percent of children aged between 6 and 18 were enrolled in a school in the 
past 12 months in 2006. 
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this picture, the aggregate investment in the education quality for girls would increase relative to that for boys 
as a result of the FSPs. Arguably, this would be the outcome that is naturally expected from the introduction of 
the FSPs. 
However, our earlier empirical findings are clearly inconsistent with increased complementary demand for 
education quality. Figure 3 also allows us to explain why the expected outcome may not occur. First, the demand 
for the quality of education may remain unchanged if the equilibrium price is above the choke price for girls. To 
demonstrate this point, suppose now that the supply curve is the black dashed line such that the equilibrium 
price is GH regardless of the presence of the FSPs. In this case, the equilibrium demand from boys is GH and 
that from girls is zero, whether or not the FSPs are in place. Second, it is also possible that the households at the 
margin who send girls to a secondary school because of the FSPs may be unwilling to invest in the education 
quality. In this case, the demand curve for girls would be still the red solid line such that the FSPs would bring 
about no change in the market of education quality. 
These possibilities are also consistent with our observation from Table 4 that the pattern of gender bias in 
1995 is different from other years. Because the FSP coverage was substantially lower in 1995 than in 2000 and 
2005, it is not surprising that the gender gap in enrollment was insignificant in 1995. Furthermore, because many 
of the compliers—the girls who would go to school if they receive the FSPs but would not go otherwise—are 
probably not covered by the FSPs in 1995, the FSPs’ effect on the core share is also small. While we do not have 
definitive evidence, this possibility is consistent with both the empirical results and diagrammatic analysis 
presented above. 
 
   Demand curve for girls 
   Demand curve for boys 
Aggregate demand curve 
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The discussion above does not show, however, why the choke price for the education quality is so low for 
girls or why the compliers may not want to make an investment in the education quality for girls. One possible 
answer would be an inherent gender bias in the parental decision-making. However, one may also consider the 
labor market returns. As Asadullah (2006) argues, if education of girls is deemed to bring about no returns to 
their parents or to lower the prospect of marriage, parents may be discouraged from investing in girls. This 
argument is true even when parents have no inherent gender bias. Hence, even if parents do not have an inherent 
gender bias as the experiment by Begum et al. (2018) suggests, they may still choose not to invest in the quality 
of education for girls simply because it is not a good investment. 
There are at least two reasons to believe that the labor market returns are relevant. First, the return on the 
investment in the quality of education for girls may be lower than that for boys, simply because a higher fraction 
of women than men do not work after leaving school. Indeed, the female labor force participation rate for 
individuals aged 15 and above was only 36 percent in 2010. This denotes a significant increase from 16 percent 
in 1995, but it remains substantially lower than the corresponding figure for males, which has been stable at 
around 85 percent (Rahman and Islam, 2013). Even if women work, they tend not to work full-time, which in 
turn means that the return on the investment in the quality of education would be lower, everything else being 
equal. Even though the average number of hours worked per week by employed female labor force increased 
from 26 in 2006 to 35 in 2010, it remained much lower than the corresponding figure for male labor force, which 
was slightly above 50 during the same period (Rahman and Islam, 2013). 
Second, it may also be the case that women’s quality of education may not be valued as much as men’s 
counterpart in the labor market. If that is the case and if the distribution of the quality of education is the same 
between men and women, the female wage dispersion would be lower than male wage dispersion. To see if this 
may be the case, we use a subsample of wage earners aged between 19 and 65 in the HIES 2000, 2005, and 
201024 to create a box plot of their hourly wage rates by education level and gender among adults for each survey 
year (Figures 4 (a)-(c)). As the plot shows, the hourly wage rates for the female workers tend to be lower and less 
variable than those for male workers across all education levels and in all years. Thus, our results are consistent 
with the possibility that the quality of education for women may not be as important as that for men in the labor 
market. 
There is, however, an alternative possibility: the gender difference in the wage dispersion may be driven by 
the gender differences in the dispersion in the quality of education. However, we argue that this possibility is 
unlikely to be very important. Because private tutoring was very rare for 
24HES 1995 does not contain individual wage data. 
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Figure 4: Box plot of hourly wage by education level and gender using HIES wage earners subsample. Wage 
data are all converted to hourly wage. 
 
older generations, the gender difference in the dispersion of the quality of education is also likely to be smaller 
for them. Based on this observation, we also created a box plot with a sample of workers aged 30 years or above 
in the HIES 2000 data. As Figure 4 (d) shows, the wage dispersion for males is much larger than that for females, 
even for the generation for which private tutoring was rare. Hence, we favor the interpretation that the returns to 
the quality of education for males is larger than those for females. 
 
8 Discussion 
 
Gender parity in enrollment is a big achievement, but we would be merely indulging in illusions if we equate it 
to gender parity in education. The contradirectional gender bias in Bangladesh documented in this study—
profemale bias in enrollment and promale bias in the total education expenditure and the core share in the total 
education expenditure among school enrollees—clearly illustrates that gender parity in education cannot be 
measured by the gender parity in enrollment alone. 
At a first glance, the contradirectional gender gap is puzzling, because it cannot be explained by gender 
discrimination and because it is not found anywhere else, including India and Pakistan. Our analysis, however, 
indicates that it is driven at least in part by the presence of the FSPs. Using a double difference strategy, we show 
FSPs helped to bring girls to school. However, the analysis of the three- 
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part model suggests that the FSPs did not attract sufficient complementary investment from households in the 
quality of education, which in turn appears to have resulted in the underperformance of girls relative to boys 
among the primary school graduates. We further explored the possible explanations for the lack of investment in 
the quality of education from the households and provided some indicative evidence that the expected labor 
market returns on the investment in the quality of education for girls may have been lower than those for boys. 
Because of the data limitations, at least four potentially important factors were not taken into account in this 
paper. First, it is possible that the FSPs directly lower the quality of education for girls by selectively attracting 
girls to schools and putting them in crowded classrooms. The teacher-student ratio (TSR) in secondary schools was 
only 1:24 in 1990 but rose by 50 percent to 1:36 in 2010, indicating that the classrooms have become 
overcrowded. Moreover, given the crowded classrooms, many school teachers capitalized on this opportunity by 
systematically exerting less effort in school teaching and promoting private tutoring to earn extra income 
(Shahjamal, 2000; Mahmud, 2003). 
Second, there may be a gender difference in the effective price of private tutoring, particularly if parents 
need to pay additional supporting costs, such as private transportation for an accompanying guardian. Indeed, it 
is estimated that the cost of private tutoring for girls is 13 percent more expensive than that for boys (CAMPE, 
2006, Table A4.1 in p. 120). This observation is important, because the first-generation learners typically get no 
help with their study outside the classrooms. This, in turn, makes it difficult for children from disadvantaged 
backgrounds—particularly girls—to pass the SSC examination, because after-school tutoring is crucial for 
students struggling academically, especially in mathematics and English (Nakata et al., 2018). 
Third, a related factor is the supply-side constraint on female private tutors. While we are not aware of data on 
the availability of tutors, it seems likely that female private tutors were scarce, particularly in earlier years. 
Therefore, some parents with traditional social norms may choose not to hire a private tutor for their daughter, not 
because they are unwilling or unable to pay, but because there is no female tutor available. However, the supply-
side constraint is unlikely to be of primary importance, because the contradirectionality of the gender gap did not 
change much after the year 2000, even though women have been getting better educated.25 
Fourth, the argument we put forth in Section 7 is based on an implicit assumption that the households have 
the information and rationality to make education decisions based on the labor market returns. This, of course, 
may not be true. For example, the gender gap in the total education expenditure and core share may be attributed 
to lack of knowledge, misinformed beliefs, incorrect valuation 
25According to BANBEIS (2010, Table 2.1.0 in p. 30), the proportion of female teachers in secondary schools was 13.88 percent 
in 1995. This figure has reached 23.09 percent in 2010. 
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of schooling returns, and gender difference in the way future costs and benefits are discounted (Baland and 
Robinson, 2000). Even if parents do not have inherent gender bias, their decisions may be biased if doing 
otherwise is socially costly in the presence of strong patriarchal social norms. Given these possibilities, labor 
market returns are likely to be only one of—and not the only—potential factors that lead to the gender gap in the 
investment in the quality of education from households. 
Our results highlight both the opportunities and challenges that a targeted CCT program like the FSPs is 
likely to face. On one hand, the FSPs were successful as it substantially increased the secondary school enrollment 
rate by 15 percentage points or more. Even though the secondary enrollment rate for girls historically lagged far 
behind that for boys, girls have overtaken boys soon after the nationwide rollout of the FSPs. This demonstrates 
that incentives work. 
On the other hand, our results also suggest that the quality of education for girls continued to lag behind that 
for boys among school enrollees because of the lack of investment in quality. As a result, girls’ observable 
educational outcomes have also been worse than boys’. As shown in Figure 1, girls underperformed boys both 
in the passing rate and share of top students in the SSC examination. Further, conditional on the primary school 
completion, girls are less likely to graduate from secondary school on time. Therefore, our results clearly show 
that the narrowing of the gender gap in the quantity of education does not translate into the narrowing of the 
gender gap in the quality of education. 
The findings of this study offer three important policy implications. First, CCT programs have a potential to 
narrow the gender gap in enrollment, even in a traditionally patriarchal country like Bangladesh, by providing 
households with adequate incentives to send girls to schools. Second, despite the first point, the quantity of 
education as measured by enrollment or years of education does not tell the whole story about the gender gap in 
education, because the incentive to increase the quantity of education does not necessarily lead to an 
improvement in the quality of education. On the contrary, CCT programs like the FSPs may directly reduce the 
quality of school education if they make classrooms overcrowded. This may increase the households’ dependence 
on private tutoring and would exacerbate the female disadvantage because of the promale intrahousehold 
allocation of educational resources.26 Therefore, policymakers must be aware of this limitation and consider 
implementing complementary policies. 
Third, it would not be possible to truly achieve gender equality in education without addressing 
26There is some suggestive evidence on the link connection between the FSP intensity and private tutoring. Based on 
the regressions of the use and amount of spending of private tutoring on the FSP intensity as measured by GRR, we 
find i) both girls and boys are more likely to have private tutoring in more FSP-intensive areas, ii) the share of the 
expenditure on private tutoring in the total expenditure for girls tends to be lower than that for boys conditional on the 
use of private tutoring, and iii) this gender gap is larger in more FSP-intensive areas in 2000 and 2005 (see footnote21 
for the reason of the choice of these years). Even though the sign is consistent between these two years, we refrain from 
drawing strong conclusions because the estimates are not always statistically significant and because we do not observe 
the teacher-student ratio in the schools children attend. 
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the gender gap in the investment in the quality of education by households, as apparent from the 
underperformance of girls in secondary schools. Arguably, the quality is more difficult to address than the 
quantity, because the factors affecting the former—such as labor market returns and inherent gender bias among 
parents—may be beyond the control of those who make education policies. Nevertheless, interventions that are 
targeted to improve the access to education of better quality among disadvantages groups (e.g., voucher program in 
India (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2015)) or those that improve some supply factors for girls may narrow 
the gender gap in the quality of education. 
There is indeed a piece of indicative evidence from a field experiment in Bangladesh. An impact assessment 
of the additional class teacher (ACT) program—in which teachers are hired to teach regular and additional 
supplementary classes in undeserved and low-performing areas—demonstrates positive impacts on the learning 
performance and the impact is particularly strong for girls (World Bank, 2018, Table 7.5). Further, anecdotal 
evidence suggests significant reduction in the prevalence of private coaching practices at schools where ACTs 
are operating (World Bank, 2018, p. 33). Hence, it seems possible to move towards gender equality in the quality 
of education, if policies are implemented to ensure quality education, particularly for those who are 
disadvantaged. 
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Appendix 
 
A Derivation of the likelihood function for the three-part model 
 
In total, there are four separate cases to consider to construct the likelihood function for the three-part model: 
 
Case 1: 𝑑 = 0.  
 𝑙1 = 𝑃(𝜀𝑑 ≤ −𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑) = Φ(−𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑). 
 
Case 2: 𝑑 = 1, 𝑠 = 0.  
 𝑙2 =
1
𝑦
𝑃(−𝜀𝑑 ≤ 𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑, 𝜀𝑠 ≤ −𝑥′𝑠𝛽𝑠| 𝜀𝑦 = log(𝑦) − 𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦) ⋅ 𝑓(log(𝑦) − 𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦), 
 where 𝑓(⋅) is the density function of 𝜀𝑦. 
We rearrange the distribution of the error terms as follows:  
 [
−𝜀𝑑
𝜀𝑠
𝜀𝑦
] ~𝑁(𝟎, [
1 −𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜎𝑠 −𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜎𝑦
−𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜎𝑠 𝜎𝑠
2 𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠
−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜎𝑦 𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠 𝜎𝑦
2.
]). 
 
(−𝜀𝑑, 𝜀𝑠)′ given 𝜀𝑦 follows a bivariate normal distribution with:  
 𝐄 ((
−𝜀𝑑
𝜀𝑠
)| 𝜀𝑦) = (
0
0
) + (
−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜎𝑦
𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠
)
1
𝜎𝑦
2 (𝜀𝑦 − 0) = (
−
𝜌𝑑𝑦
𝜎𝑦
𝜀𝑦
𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑠
𝜎𝑦
𝜀𝑦
), 
 and  
 𝐕𝐚𝐫 ((
−𝜀𝑑
𝜀𝑠
)| 𝜀𝑦) = (
1 −𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜎𝑠
−𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜎𝑠 𝜎𝑠
2 ) − (
−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜎𝑦
𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠
)
1
𝜎𝑦
2 (−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜎𝑦 𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠) 
 = (
1 − 𝜌𝑑𝑦
2 (𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑦𝑠 − 𝜌𝑑𝑠)𝜎𝑠
(𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑦𝑠 − 𝜌𝑑𝑠)𝜎𝑠 (1 − 𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )𝜎𝑠
2 ). 
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Then, we have:  
 𝑃(−𝜀𝑑 ≤ 𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑, 𝜀𝑠 ≤ −𝑥′𝑠𝛽𝑠| 𝜀𝑦 = log(𝑦) − 𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦) 
 = Ψ(
𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑+𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜀𝑦/𝜎𝑦
√1−𝜌𝑑𝑦
2
, −
𝑥′𝑠𝛽𝑠+𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑠𝜀𝑦/𝜎𝑦
𝜎𝑠√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
,
𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑦𝑠−𝜌𝑑𝑠
√(1−𝜌𝑑𝑦
2 )(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )
), 
 and  
 𝑓(log(𝑦) − 𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦) =
1
𝜎𝑦
𝜙(
log(𝑦)−𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦
𝜎𝑦
). 
 Thus, the likelihood for this case is:  
 𝑙2 =
𝜙(𝑒𝑦)
𝑦𝜎𝑦
⋅ Ψ(
𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑+𝜌𝑑𝑦𝑒𝑦
√1−𝜌𝑑𝑦
2
, −
𝑥′𝑠𝛽𝑠+𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑦
𝜎𝑠√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
,
𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑦𝑠−𝜌𝑑𝑠
√(1−𝜌𝑑𝑦
2 )(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )
). 
Case 3: 𝑑 = 1, 𝑠 ∈ (0,1).  
𝑙3 =
1
𝑦
𝑃(−𝜀𝑑 ≤ 𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑| 𝜀𝑦 = log(𝑦) − 𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦, 𝜀𝑠 = 𝑠 − 𝑥′𝑠𝛽𝑠) ⋅ 𝑔(log(𝑦) − 𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦, 𝑠 − 𝑥′𝑠𝛽𝑠), 
 where 𝑔(⋅,⋅) is the joint density function for 𝜀𝑦 and 𝜀𝑠. 
Let the submatrix Σ11 be  
 Σ11 = (
𝜎𝑦
2 𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠
𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠 𝜎𝑠
2 ). 
 Thus, we have  
 Σ11
−1 =
1
(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )𝜎𝑦
2𝜎𝑠
2 (
𝜎𝑠
2 −𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠
−𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠 𝜎𝑦
2 ), 
 where the determinant of Σ11 is |Σ11| = (1 − 𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )𝜎𝑦
2𝜎𝑠
2. 
It can be shown that −𝜀𝑑 given 𝜀𝑦 and 𝜀𝑠 follows a normal distribution with:  
 𝐄(−𝜀𝑑|𝜀𝑦, 𝜀𝑠) = 0 +
1
|Σ11|
(−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜎𝑦 −𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜎𝑠) (
𝜎𝑠
2 −𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠
−𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠 𝜎𝑦
2 ) (
𝜀𝑦
𝜀𝑠
) 
 = −
1
(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )𝜎𝑦
2𝜎𝑠
2 ((𝜌𝑑𝑦 − 𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜌𝑦𝑠)𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠
2 (𝜌𝑑𝑠 − 𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑦𝑠)𝜎𝑦
2𝜎𝑠)) (
𝜀𝑦
𝜀𝑠
) 
 = −
(𝜌𝑑𝑦−𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜌𝑦𝑠)𝜎𝑠𝜀𝑦+(𝜌𝑑𝑠−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑦𝑠)𝜎𝑦𝜀𝑠
(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠
, 
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and  
 𝐕𝐚𝐫(−𝜀𝑑|𝜀𝑦, 𝜀𝑠) = 1 −
1
|Σ11|
(−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜎𝑦 −𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜎𝑠) (
𝜎𝑠
2 −𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠
−𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠 𝜎𝑦
2 ) (
−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜎𝑦
−𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜎𝑠
) 
 = 1 −
1
(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )𝜎𝑦
2𝜎𝑠
2 (−(𝜌𝑑𝑦 − 𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜌𝑦𝑠)𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠
2 −(𝜌𝑑𝑠 − 𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑦𝑠)𝜎𝑦
2𝜎𝑠) (
−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜎𝑦
−𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜎𝑠
) 
 = 1 −
(𝜌𝑑𝑦−𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜌𝑦𝑠)𝜌𝑑𝑦+(𝜌𝑑𝑠−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑦𝑠)𝜌𝑑𝑠
(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )
 
 =
1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 −𝜌𝑑𝑦
2 −𝜌𝑑𝑠
2 +2𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜌𝑦𝑠
1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 . 
 
We then have  
 𝑃(−𝜀𝑑 ≤ 𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑| 𝜀𝑦 = log(𝑦) − 𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦, 𝜀𝑠 = 𝑠 − 𝑥′𝑠𝛽𝑠) 
 = Φ(
𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )+(𝜌𝑑𝑦−𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜌𝑦𝑠)(log(𝑦)−𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦)/𝜎𝑦+(𝜌𝑑𝑠−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑦𝑠)(𝑠−𝑥′𝑠𝛽𝑠)/𝜎𝑠
√(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 −𝜌𝑑𝑦
2 −𝜌𝑑𝑠
2 +2𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜌𝑦𝑠)(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )
), 
 and  
 𝑔(𝜀𝑦, 𝜀𝑠) = 𝑔(log(𝑦) − 𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦, 𝑠 − 𝑥′𝑠𝛽𝑠) 
 =
1
2𝜋𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
exp [−
1
2
(𝜀𝑦 𝜀𝑠)
1
|Σ11|
(
𝜎𝑠
2 −𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠
−𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠 𝜎𝑦
2 ) (
𝜀𝑦
𝜀𝑠
)] 
 =
1
2𝜋𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
exp [−
𝜀𝑦
2𝜎𝑠
2−2𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠𝜀𝑦𝜀𝑠+𝜀𝑠
2𝜎𝑦
2
2(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )𝜎𝑦
2𝜎𝑠
2 ] 
 =
1
𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
𝜙(
𝜀𝑦
𝜎𝑦√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
)𝜙(
𝜀𝑠
𝜎𝑠√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
)exp (𝜌𝑦𝑠
𝜀𝑦𝜀𝑠
(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠
) 
 =
1
𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
𝜙(
log(𝑦)−𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦
𝜎𝑦√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
)𝜙(
𝑠−𝑥′𝑠𝛽𝑠
𝜎𝑠√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
)exp (𝜌𝑦𝑠
(log(𝑦)−𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦)(𝑠−𝑥′𝑠𝛽𝑠)
(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠
). 
 
Thus, the likelihood for this case is:  
 𝑙3 =
1
𝑦𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
Φ(
𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )+(𝜌𝑑𝑦−𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜌𝑦𝑠)𝑒𝑦+(𝜌𝑑𝑠−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑦𝑠)𝑒𝑠
√(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 −𝜌𝑑𝑦
2 −𝜌𝑑𝑠
2 +2𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜌𝑦𝑠)(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )
) 
  ⋅ 𝜙 (
𝑒𝑦
√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
)𝜙(
𝑒𝑠
√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
)exp (𝜌𝑦𝑠
𝑒𝑦𝑒𝑠
1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 ). 
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Case 4: 𝑑 = 1, 𝑠 = 1.  
 𝑙4 =
1
𝑦
𝑃(−𝜀𝑑 ≤ 𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑, −𝜀𝑠 ≤ 𝑥′𝑠𝛽𝑠 − 1| 𝜀𝑦 = log(𝑦) − 𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦) ⋅ 𝑓(log(𝑦) − 𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦) 
 
We rearrange the distribution of the error terms as follows:  
 [
−𝜀𝑑
−𝜀𝑠
𝜀𝑦
] ~𝑁(𝟎, [
1 𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜎𝑠 −𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜎𝑦
𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜎𝑠 𝜎𝑠
2 −𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠
−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜎𝑦 −𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠 𝜎𝑦
2
]). 
 
(−𝜀𝑑, −𝜀𝑠)
𝑇 given 𝜀𝑦 follows bivariate normal distribution with:  
 𝐄 ((
−𝜀𝑑
−𝜀𝑠
)| 𝜀𝑦) = (
0
0
) + (
−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜎𝑦
−𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠
)
1
𝜎𝑦
2 (𝜀𝑦 − 0) = (
−
𝜌𝑑𝑦
𝜎𝑦
𝜀𝑦
−
𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑠
𝜎𝑦
𝜀𝑦
), 
 and  
 𝐕𝐚𝐫 ((
−𝜀𝑑
−𝜀𝑠
)| 𝜀𝑦) = (
1 𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜎𝑠
𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜎𝑠 𝜎𝑠
2 ) − (
−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜎𝑦
−𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠
)
1
𝜎𝑦
2 (−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜎𝑦 −𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠) 
 = (
1 𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜎𝑠
𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜎𝑠 𝜎𝑠
2 ) − (
𝜌𝑑𝑦
2 𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑠
𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑠 𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 𝜎𝑠
2 ) 
 = (
1 − 𝜌𝑑𝑦
2 (𝜌𝑑𝑠 − 𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑦𝑠)𝜎𝑠
(𝜌𝑑𝑠 − 𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑦𝑠)𝜎𝑠 (1 − 𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )𝜎𝑠
2 ). 
 
Then, we have  
 𝑃(−𝜀𝑑 ≤ 𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑, −𝜀𝑠 ≤ 𝑥′𝑠𝛽𝑠 − 1| 𝜀𝑦 = log(𝑦) − 𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦) 
 = Ψ(
𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑+𝜌𝑑𝑦(log(𝑦)−𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦)/𝜎𝑦
√1−𝜌𝑑𝑦
2
,
𝑥′𝑠𝛽𝑠−1+𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑠(log(𝑦)−𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦)/𝜎𝑦
𝜎𝑠√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
,
𝜌𝑑𝑠−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑦𝑠
√(1−𝜌𝑑𝑦
2 )(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )
), 
 and  
 𝑓(log(𝑦) − 𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦) =
1
𝜎𝑦
𝜙 (
log(𝑦)−𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦
𝜎𝑦
). 
 Thus, the likelihood for this case is:  
 𝑙4 =
𝜙(𝑒𝑦)
𝑦𝜎𝑦
⋅ Ψ(
𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑+𝜌𝑑𝑦𝑒𝑦
√1−𝜌𝑑𝑦
2
,
𝑥′𝑠𝛽𝑠−1+𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑠𝑒𝑦
𝜎𝑠√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
,
𝜌𝑑𝑠−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑦𝑠
√(1−𝜌𝑑𝑦
2 )(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )
), 
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where 𝑒𝑦 =
log(𝑦)−𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦
𝜎𝑦
 and 𝑒𝑠 =
𝑠−𝑥′𝑠𝛽𝑠
𝜎𝑠
. 
 
B Derivation of marginal effects 
 
The equation for the expected enrollment is straightforward. The equation for the conditional expenditure can 
be derived as follows: 
 𝐸(𝑦|𝑑 = 1) = ∫
∞
0
𝑦𝑓(𝑦|𝑑 = 1)𝑑𝑦 = ∫
∞
0
𝑦𝑓(𝑦|𝜀𝑑 > −𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑)𝑑𝑦 
 = ∫
∞
0
𝑦
1
𝑦
𝑓(𝜀𝑦|𝜀𝑑 > −𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑)𝑑𝑦 = ∫
∞
0
𝑓(𝜀𝑦,𝜀𝑑>−𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑)
𝑃(𝜀𝑑>−𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑)
𝑑𝑦 
 = ∫
∞
0
𝑓(𝜀𝑑>−𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑|𝜀𝑦)𝑓(𝜀𝑦)
𝑃(𝜀𝑑>−𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑)
𝑑𝑦 
 = ∫
∞
0
Φ(
𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑+𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜀𝑦/𝜎𝑦
√1−𝜌𝑑𝑦
2
)𝜙(
𝜀𝑦
𝜎𝑦
)/𝜎𝑦
Φ(𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑)
𝑑𝑦, 
 where 𝜀𝑦 = log(𝑦) − 𝑥′𝑦𝛽𝑦. 
The unconditional expectation of 𝑦 is:  
 𝐸(𝑦) = 𝑃(𝑑 = 1)𝐸(𝑦|𝑑 = 1) = ∫
∞
0
1
𝜎𝑦
Φ(
𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑+𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜀𝑦/𝜎𝑦
√1−𝜌𝑑𝑦
2
)𝜙 (
𝜀𝑦
𝜎𝑦
) 𝑑𝑦. 
 
Unconditional expectation of the core expenditure 𝑦𝑠 is:  
 𝐸(𝑦𝑠) = ∫
1
0
∫
∞
0
𝑦𝑠𝑓(𝑦, 𝑠)𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑠 
 = ∫
∞
0
𝑦 ⋅ 1 ⋅ 𝑓(𝑑 = 1, 𝑦, 𝑠 = 1)𝑑𝑦 + ∫
1
0
∫
∞
0
𝑦𝑠𝑓(𝑑 = 1, 𝑦, 𝑠)𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑠 
 = ∫
∞
0
1
𝜎𝑦
𝜙(
𝜀𝑦
𝜎𝑦
)Ψ(
𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑+𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜀𝑦/𝜎𝑦
√1−𝜌𝑑𝑦
2
,
𝑥′𝑠𝛽𝑠−1+𝜌𝑦𝑠𝜎𝑠𝜀𝑦/𝜎𝑦
𝜎𝑠√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
,
𝜌𝑑𝑠−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑦𝑠
√(1−𝜌𝑑𝑦
2 )(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )
)𝑑𝑦 
 +∫
1
0
∫
∞
0
𝑦𝑠
1
𝑦𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
Φ(
𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )+(𝜌𝑑𝑦−𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜌𝑦𝑠)𝜀𝑦/𝜎𝑦+(𝜌𝑑𝑠−𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑦𝑠)𝜀𝑠/𝜎𝑠
√(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 −𝜌𝑑𝑦
2 −𝜌𝑑𝑠
2 +2𝜌𝑑𝑦𝜌𝑑𝑠𝜌𝑦𝑠)(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )
) 
 × 𝜙(
𝜀𝑦
𝜎𝑦√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
)𝜙(
𝜀𝑠
𝜎𝑠√1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2
)exp (𝜌𝑦𝑠
𝜀𝑦𝜀𝑠
𝜎𝑦𝜎𝑠(1−𝜌𝑦𝑠
2 )
)𝑑𝑦𝑑𝑠, 
 where 𝜀𝑠 = 𝑠 − 𝑥′𝑠𝛽𝑠. 
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The expectation of the core expenditure conditional on enrollment is: 
 
𝐸(𝑦𝑠|𝑑 = 1) =
𝐸(𝑦𝑠)
𝑃(𝑑 = 1)
=
𝐸(𝑦𝑠)
Φ(𝑥′𝑑𝛽𝑑)
. 
We compute the conditional and unconditional expectations at the sample mean by replacing the parameters 
(θ) with the ML estimates (θˆM L) given covariates. The marginal effect of being a girl is computed by taking the 
difference in these expectations when the girl dummy is set equal to zero and when it is equal to one. 
We obtain the standard errors for the marginal effects by the following simulation. We first draw the parameter 
θ from a multivariate normal distribution, where its mean and variance respectively follow the point estimate 
and its variance-covariance matrix from the ML estimation. We then calculate the marginal effects again with 
the drawn value of θ using the expressions above. By repeating this 100 times and taking the standard deviation 
of the estimates of the marginal effect across replications, we obtain a standard error. 
In principle, we can calculate the marginal effect for each observation and then calculate the average marginal 
effect over all observations. However, we choose to calculate only the marginal effects at the sample mean, where 
the sample mean of the whole sample [subsample of secondary school enrollees] is used for the marginal effects on 
the probability of enrollment and unconditional quantities [conditional quantities] to reduce the computational 
burden.27 
 
C Tuition and quality of education 
 
To understand the relationship between the tuition fee and quality of education, we would ideally run a regression 
of tuition fee on an indicator of education quality. However, we do not have school-level data that can be linked to 
HES/HIES data. Instead, we run a regression of the average test score on the average tuition per student at the 
school level using the datasets for the Comparing Food versus Cash for Education (FFE-CFE) program for the 
years 2000 and 2003 collected by the International Food Policy Research Institute.28 While these data are 
available only for primary schools, this is the only dataset to our knowledge that allows us to link the tuition fee 
and educational outcome in Bangladesh. 
Figure 5 is a scatter plot between the average tuition per student and average test scores at the school level 
in 2000 and 2003. As this figure shows, the average test score is higher in schools that 
27Matlab was used for computation of the marginal effects and STATA was used in the rest of the analysis. 
28The details of the FFE-CFE program datasets is available from https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml? 
persistentId=hdl:1902.1/15640 and https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/ 15580 accessed on 
December 12, 2017. 
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Figure 5: The scatter plot of the average test score and the average tuition fee charged by the school for the years 
2000 (top) and 2003 (bottom) based on the FFE-CFE data. Each blue triangle [red circle] represents a public 
[nonpublic] school, and the size of each marker is proportionate to the number of enrolled students in the school. 
The green lines represent the linear fits (weighted), and their slopes are significantly different from 0 at a 10 
percent level. 
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impose a higher tuition in both years. Clearly, this should not be taken as definitive evidence that higher tuition 
reflects higher educational quality at the secondary level for a number of reasons. First, the data we use here are 
for the primary level and not the secondary level. This distinction may matter because private schools at the 
primary level are not as common as they are at the secondary level. Second, the data are not nationally 
representative and the sample selection may be an issue. Third, we do not consider the effect of endogenous 
school choice; it may be the case that those children with parents who can afford to pay a high tuition are those 
with high innate ability or those who receive complementary private tutoring. Nevertheless, Figure 5 is 
consistent with the possibility that higher tuition reflects higher educational quality. 
It should be noted that the tuition fee is not a simple reflection of school type. In the FFE-CFE data, there is 
indeed a substantial variation in the tuition per student both in private and public schools as Figure 5 shows. 
Correspondingly, there appear to be significant variations in quality within each type. Casual observations of 
schools indicate that most of the top schools are private in Bangladesh. On the other hand, the BANBEIS 
database suggests that private schools are smaller and of lower quality than public schools on average. For 
example, the average quality of teachers in private schools is worse than that of public schools as measured by 
the fraction of trained teachers.29 Student-teacher ratios for private schools were, if anything, slightly higher than 
those for public schools at the secondary level in the past, even though they are very similar today.30 Therefore, 
the average quality of private schools appears to be lower than that of public schools. 
 
D Falsification test 
 
To support the findings on the impact of the FSPs on the quantity measures of education in Section 6, we conduct 
a falsification test. Our strategy is to estimate the FSPs’ impacts on the years of completed education and 
enrollment, if the year of introduction of the FSPs were hypothetically moved earlier by five years. We chose five 
years to balance the number of observations before and after the hypothetical introduction of the FSPs without 
losing too many observations. To make a fair comparison between the estimates based on the actual year and 
hypothetical year (i.e., five years prior to the actual year) of introduction of the FSPs, we first construct two 
estimation samples, one for each of the actual and hypothetical years. 
We choose the individuals aged 16-20 and compare them with those aged 21-26 in the actual year of 
introduction of the FSPs, where the former and latter groups serve as the treatment and comparison 
29According to BANBEIS (2010), 84 percent [78 percent] of teachers are trained in public [private] school in 2010. 
30This is not true at the primary level. Private schools are smaller and student-teacher ratios in private schools are 
much lower than those in public schools. 
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groups for the purpose of the falsification test. Neither groups are likely to have benefitted substantially from the 
FSPs as they are already past the official secondary-school age, even though a small fraction of those in the 
treatment group may have benefitted from the FSPs due to delayed entry into school and grade repetition. To 
conduct the falsification test, we move forward the year of introduction of the FSPs by five years so that the 
individuals in the (hypothetical) comparison [treatment] group are aged 16-20 [11-15] in the hypothetical year 
of the introduction of the FSPs. 
Since the falsification sample is produced by restricting each of the treatment and comparison groups to a set of 
individuals who were born within a five-year band, we also re-estimate the impacts of the FSPs on the quantity 
measures of education by applying a similar sample restriction to make a fair comparison. Specifically, we 
choose the individuals aged 6-10 [16-20] for the treatment [comparison] group in the actual year of introduction 
of the FSPs to estimate the actual impact of the FSPs. Note that we chose not to use those aged 11-15 because 
they are not fully covered by the FSPs; this is an approach similar to that of Duflo (2001). 
In this section, we focus on the analyses of HIES 2005 and 2010, because many of those aged 6-10 at the 
time of the nationwide rollout of the FSPs in 1994 have not completed their education in 1995 and 2000 as they 
are still aged, respectively, 7-11 and 12-16 in 1995 and 2000. For the analysis of the completed years of 
education, we simply take all individuals satisfying the age criteria discussed above. For the analysis of enrollment, 
we take the retrospectively-constructed enrollment records corresponding to ages 11-15. 
In the odd-numbered columns in Table 14, we report the estimation results based on the actual year of 
introduction of FSPs. They serve as our benchmarks and are quantitatively and qualitatively comparable to those 
reported in Table 8. While the point estimates appear to be somewhat attenuated and standard errors tend to be 
larger than those reported in Table 8, these are to be expected because those who are aged 16-20 may benefit 
from the FSPs and the sample size used in Table 14 is smaller. 
In the even numbered columns, we report the results of the falsification test, where the year introduction of 
the FSPs are set at the hypothetical year, or five years prior to the actual year of introduction. As expected, none of 
the coefficients is positive and significant, and all coefficients are smaller in absolute value than those reported in 
the odd numbered columns. Therefore, our falsification test provides suggestive evidence that the estimated 
positive effects of the FSPs on the quantity measures of education are not spurious. In particular, they are 
unlikely to be driven by subdistrict-specific time trends that are correlated with the rollout of the FSPs. Thus, 
the results in Table 8 indeed appear to be driven by the rollout of FSPs. 
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Table 14: Impacts of the FSPs on the quantity measures of education 
 
HIES 2005 HIES 2010 
 Actual Hypothetical  Actual Hypothetical  
Coef (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
Panel A: Years of education 
Girl -1.037*** -0.917*** -1.327*** -0.842** 
 (0.260) (0.293) (0.314) (0.380) 
FSP Cover -0.784 -0.348 -1.298 0.406 
 (1.110) (0.619) (1.255) (0.599) 
Girl × FSPCover 1.310*** 
(0.393) 
0.019 
(0.378) 
1.533*** 
(0.363) 
-0.346 
(0.527) 
Obs 5,669 6,963 8,898 7,324 
Mean of dep. var. 5.268 4.260 5.204 4.020 
Panel B: Enrollment using retrospective data 
Girl -0.117*** -0.081*** -0.148*** -0.079** 
 (0.025) (0.029) (0.031) (0.038) 
FSP Cover -0.098 -0.082 -0.092 -0.037 
 (0.163) (0.082) (0.135) (0.062) 
Girl × FSPCover 0.154*** 
(0.030) 
0.009 
(0.040) 
0.172*** 
(0.036) 
-0.027 
(0.053) 
Obs 38,985 34,815 44,490 36,620 
Mean of dep. var. 0.401 0.297 0.360 0.272 
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in 
parentheses. In Panel A, we additionally include the fixed-effects terms specific to the 
birth year and household. In Panel B, we additionally include the fixed-effects terms 
specific to the birth year, age at the time of observation, household, and year of 
observation. 
 
E Comparison with Heath and Mobarak (2015) estimates 
 
As mentioned in Section 6, our finding of a positive impact of the FSPs on enrollment is notably at odds with 
Heath and Mobarak (2015, hereafter HM), who found no evidence that the FSPs have a positive impact on 
female enrollment. Therefore, we investigate the source of inconsistency between our results and theirs. To this 
end, we start with their data and specification and gradually change various elements of HM’s analysis to arrive 
at our preferred estimate within the framework of the triple difference estimation used by HM. We argue that our 
preferred estimate is more suitable as an estimate of the impact of the FSPs on school enrollment in Bangladesh 
than HM’s estimate. 
The identification of the impact of the FSPs in the HM’s analysis relies on the triple difference approach, 
which is somewhat similar to the double differences specification in eq. (6). However, in addition to the 
differences between the two genders and between those who are in the subdistrict covered by FSP at the time of 
observation and those who are not, the HM’s analysis also includes the data for the primary-school age group 
and takes the third difference between the FSP-eligible and 
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FSP-ineligible individuals, essentially using the fact that primary school children would not directly benefit 
from the FSPs. Therefore, the generic triple difference specification we use for the comparison of our preferred 
specification with HM can be written as follows: 
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼1𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖ℎ + 𝛼2𝐹𝑆𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖ℎ𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖ℎ𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐹𝑆𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖ℎ𝑡 × 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖ℎ𝑡 
 
 +𝛼5𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖ℎ × 𝐹𝑆𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖ℎ𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖ℎ𝑡 × 𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖ℎ 
+𝛼7𝐹𝑆𝑃𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖ℎ𝑡 × 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖ℎ𝑡 × 𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖ℎ + 𝜆𝑡
0 + 𝜆𝑡
1 × 𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖ℎ + ∑
𝑎=18
𝑎=5
𝛽𝑎
0 × 𝟏(𝐴𝑔𝑒 = 𝑎) 
      +∑𝑎=18𝑎=5 𝛽𝑎
1 × 𝟏(𝐴𝑔𝑒 = 𝑎) × 𝐺𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖ℎ + 𝜃ℎ + 𝜀𝑖ℎ𝑡, (7) 
 
where Eligibleiht is the dummy variable for the FSP eligibility and βs, λs, and θh represent, respectively, 
agegender-, time-gender-, and household-specific fixed effects. α7 is the coefficient of our main interest. 
Let us now highlight three major differences between HM’s specification and our preferred specification in 
the triple difference framework. First, the definition of FSPCoveriht is different. In HM, it is an indicator for the 
year 1994 or later (“P94”), which is a reasonable choice because the FSP was scaled up significantly in 1994 
and all four subdistricts in the HM’s data (See Appendix B of Heath and Mobarak (2015)) were indeed first 
covered by the FSPs in 1994. However, in our preferred specification, we take into account the full information 
(“Full”) about the rollout of the FSPs to address the fact that some subdistricts were covered by the FSPs before 
1994. Second, the definition of Eligibleiht is also different. In HM, it is an indicator for having completed at 
least 6 years of schooling at the time of observation, which means that the individual has already completed the 
first year of secondary school. In our preferred specification, we instead define Eligibleiht as an indicator for having 
completed a primary school, or five years of education. We argue that this is a more suitable definition, because 
individuals would make an enrollment decision taking into account whether they would benefit from the FSPs if 
they enroll. Finally, the data are different. In particular, HM’s data were collected in 2009 and only cover 4 
subdistricts (“HM4”), but our preferred specification uses all districts (“All”) included in the nationally-
representative HIES 2010 dataset. 
To ensure the maximum comparability, we construct the retrospective panel data on enrollment both from the 
HM’s data and HIES 2010 using the same rule. As with the construction of the enrollment indicator for eq. (6), 
we construct the past enrollment status using the age and maximum educational attainment at the time of 
observation under the assumption of no grade repetition. Because we also include observations corresponding 
to the primary school children in this section, we do this exercise 
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Table 15: Effects of FSPs on school enrollment: comparison with HM 
 
 
Data source  HMa    HIES 2010  
Dep var: Enrolliht (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  
Panel A: Eligible is 6+ years of education 
FSPCover × Eligible ×Girl -0.0097 -0.017 0.057 0.020** 0.017* 
(0.0609) (0.059) (0.056) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
Panel B: Eligible is primary school completion (5+ years of education) 
FSPCover × Eligible × Girl — 0.046 0.100* 0.078*** 0.078*** 
(0.050) (0.053) (0.008) (0.009) 
Definition of FSPCoverb  P94  P94  P94 P94 Full 
Subdistricts in the samplec HM4 HM4 HM4  All  All 
 
Observations 23,129 23,116 9,216 517,039 517,039 
No. of Individual — 2,244 766 45,444 45,444 
No. of Household 878 878 220 12,124 12,124 
a Column (1) uses the enrollment data HM constructed (JDE HM data -- enrollment.dta). Column (2) uses educational 
attainment data (JDE HM data -- educational attainment.dta), which contain the age, gender, and highest educational 
attainment, but not the actual entry age in school. These two data cannot be merged because there is no individual 
identifier. As a result, we are unable to redefine Eligibleiht to obtain an estimate for column (1) of Panel B. 
b In columns 
(1)–(4), the FSP coverage indicator (FSPCoveriht) is an indicator for the year 1994 or later (“P94”), whereas it uses 
full information (“Full”) about the FSP rollout in column (5). 
c The samples used in columns (1) – (3) cover the four districts in the HM data (“HM4”). Column (4) – (5) use all 
subdistricts (“All”) in HIES 2010. 
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The estimation is based on the 
OLS estimation of eq. (7). Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. The fixed-effects 
terms by the household, age-gender combination, age-year combination are included in all regressions. Further, FSPCover, 
Eligible, and Girl, and the interactions between any two of these three variables are also included. 
 
 
under the assumption that all children start grade 1 at age 6. As with HM, we take all observations for those 
individuals who are aged between 5 and 18 at the time of observation and do this for the period between 1960 
and 2007. 
Table 15 provides the estimation results for eq. (7) based on different choices of data and definitions of 
FSPCoveriht and Eligibleiht. In Panel A, we use at least six years of education as the FSP eligibility criterion to 
be consistent with HM. In Panel B, we use the primary school completion as the FSP eligibility criterion. 
Columns (1)-(3) use only HM4 subdistricts, whereas columns (4)-(5) use all subdistricts. Columns (1)-(4) use 
P94 for the definition of FSPCover, whereas column (5) uses full information. 
In column (1) of Panel A, we reproduce the estimate of the FSP impact reported in HM, which uses the 
actual age at which the individual entered school. This estimate indeed suggests that the FSPs had no impact on 
enrollment. Because we do not observe the actual age of school entry in HIES, we have to make the assumption 
that children enters primary school at age 6. Based on this assumption, we reconstructed retrospective panel 
data on enrollment using the HM data and ran the 
59 
 
 
 
same regression. As reported in column (2) of Panel A, the estimate remains similar. Therefore, our entry-age 
assumption does not appear to alter the results much. 
Now, let us compare Panels A and B of column (2). While point estimates are both insignificant, it is worth 
noting that the point estimate is positive when the primary completion is used for the eligibility definition. Column 
(3) uses the HIES 2010 data instead of the HM data, but we focus on the HM4 subdistricts. While both data 
were randomly sampled and the difference between columns (2) and (3) is insignificant, it appears plausible that 
the sampling negatively affected the estimated FSP impact from the HM data relative to that from the HIES 
2010 data. 
In column (4), we expand the data to include all subdistricts. The larger sample size clearly allowed us to 
obtain a more accurate estimate. The point estimate is positive and significant whether we use HM’s eligibility 
definition or ours. In column (5), we use the full information about the FSP rollout instead of P94. This change 
does not affect the results much as expected, because the FSP coverage started in 1994 for most individuals. 
By comparing across the columns in Panel A, we see that both the choice of data and geographic coverage 
of the data (or sample size) appear to have affected HM’s result. However, the primary difference between the 
HM’s estimate and our preferred estimate reported in column (5) of Panel B comes from the definition of the 
eligibility criterion. 
As we argued earlier, our choice of eligibility criterion is more suitable, because the FSPs makes it more 
attractive to keep girls enrolled in school after the completion of primary education. If we use at least six years 
of education, the FSPs’ impact on the grade-6 student is absorbed by the non-eligible group. As a result, the 
FSPs’ impact would be underestimated. It is therefore not surprising that there is a sizable difference between 
the estimates in Panels A and B in each column. 
We also conducted a few robustness checks. First, we tested our results under the alternative school entry ages 
of 5 and 7, because not all children enter school at age 6. Second, instead of using the individuals aged between 
5 and 18, we limit to the sample to ages 6 to 15 to follow the stipulated primary- and secondary-school age 
groups. These analyses do not qualitatively change our results. 
It is worth noting that the magnitude of the estimated impact of the FSPs on enrollment is quantitatively 
different between Tables 8 and 15. The most comparable estimate, which uses the HIES 2010 data with 
household fixed effects reported in column (4) of Panel B of Table 8, suggests that the FSPs had a positive 
impact on enrollment by 19 percentage points. On the other hand, our preferred estimate in Table 15 suggests 
only around 8 percentage points. 
We argue that the latter estimate would serve as a lower bound of the impact for the FSP’s target age group 
for two reasons. First, by extending our earlier argument to use primary completion instead 
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of at least 6 years of education as a more suitable eligibility criterion, it can be seen that the decision to enroll 
in a primary school is likely to be positively influenced by the FSPs that are available at the secondary level. 
This in turn means that the triple difference estimate would underestimate the impact of the FSPs. Second, the 
double difference estimate in Table 8 narrowly focuses on the secondary school students. On the other hand, the 
sample used in Table 15 include relatively old individuals, aged 16 to 18, who are not the main target age of the 
FSPs. For these reasons, we prefer the double difference estimates over triple difference estimates and use the 
former in the main text. 
 
F Additional tables for summary statistics and detailed regression results 
Tables 16 and 17 provide the same summary statistics as Tables 2 and 3 except that the former are 
for the years 2000 and 2005. In Table 18, we provide the complete regression results for the three-part model 
presented in Table 4. The estimated values of ρs are all highly statistically significant, indicating the relevance 
of allowing for the correlation in the error terms. The estimations for ρdy and ρds are negatively significant at a 1 
percent level from 2000 onwards. One plausible explanation is that the unobserved academic capability affects 
the enrollment and the other two decisions in different directions, possibly because very smart students need little 
spending on education. This possibility appears to be consistent with our estimate of ρys, which is positive from 
2000 onwards. 
Table 19 shows that the regression results are similar when the independence of error terms is assumed. The 
sign and significance of the coefficients remain similar, but the absolute value of the coefficients for the 
conditional education expenditure and core share equations appears to be somewhat larger when the dependence 
structure is allowed for. 
To understand the time trend of the gender bias in the education expenditure, we estimated the three-part 
model for all years simultaneously with the time fixed effects and their interaction terms with the girl dummy 
by pooling the four survey rounds. As the regression results in Table 20 show, the gender bias remains similar 
to the year-by-year results in Table 4. That is, enrollment decision is biased in favor of girls but the opposite is 
true for the conditional expenditure and core share decisions. Further, the coefficients on the interaction terms 
between the year and girl dummy variables show that the enrollment decision has become more profemale since 
the base year of 1995. On the contrary, the core share has become more promale. The bias in the conditional 
total education expenditure did not change much over time and, if anything, became more promale. Therefore, 
Table 20 indicates that the apparent contradirectional gender gap did not change much since 1995 and, if 
anything, strengthened by the fact that the profemale bias in enrollment decision and the promale bias in the 
conditional core share decision became stronger. 
It may be argued that rural and urban samples should be analyzed separately, because there are various 
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important differences between the urban and rural areas as mentioned at the end of Section 5. Further, as detailed 
in Section 6, the FSPs only covered nonmetropolitan areas. Thus, we re-estimate the analysis of the three-part 
model separately for the urban and rural areas. As the results in Table 21 show, the directions of the gender gap in 
the three equations are essentially the same except that they are less clear in 1995. The comparison between the 
urban and rural areas shows that the contradirectional gender gap in rural areas is generally stronger than that 
in urban areas. 
Table 22 reports the marginal effect of being a girl at the sample mean for the secondary school enrollees 
for each item in education expenditure by Tobit regressions. Finally, Table 23 provides the marginal effects of 
the girl and FSP dummy variables at the sample mean for each education expenditure item. We only present the 
results for the years 2000 and 2005, because the FSP recipient status is either unavailable or irrelevant in other 
years (See footnote 21). 
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Table 16: Summary statistics of basic covariates by gender for 2000 and 2005 (secondary-school age group) 
 
 
  2000     2005  
Boy (B) Girl (G) G-B All  Boy (B) Girl (G) G-B All  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  
All children aged 11-15           
Enrolled in secondary school 0.331 0.444 0.113 0.386  0.407 0.509 0.102 0.457  
 (0.471) (0.497) *** (0.487)  (0.491) (0.500) *** (0.498)  
Child’s age (yrs) 13.012 12.908 -0.104 12.961  13.079 13.001 -0.078 13.041  
 (1.401) (1.342) *** (1.373)  (1.400) (1.350) ** (1.376)  
HH per capita expenditure 10.722 11.419 0.697 11.064  14.296 14.717 0.421 14.504  
(thousand BDT/year) (7.809) (9.013) *** (8.428)  (10.282) (11.578)  (10.943)  
Household size 6.405 6.559 0.154 6.480  5.990 6.102 0.112 6.046  
 (2.347) (2.392) ** (2.371)  (2.232) (2.162) * (2.198)  
Father’s education (yrs) 2.841 3.104 0.263 2.970  3.045 3.186 0.141 3.115  
 (4.130) (4.198) ** (4.165)  (4.187) (4.208)  (4.198)  
Mother’s education (yrs) 1.725 1.939 0.214 1.830  2.224 2.322 0.098 2.272  
 (3.095) (3.198) ** (3.148)  (3.501) (3.532)  (3.517)  
Number of children 3.533 3.635 0.102 3.583  3.243 3.336 0.093 3.289  
 (1.741) (1.758) ** (1.750)  (1.568) (1.584) ** (1.576)  
Urban 0.318 0.339 0.021 0.328  0.341 0.342 0.001 0.341  
 (0.466) (0.473)  (0.470)  (0.474) (0.474)  (0.474)  
Female head 0.073 0.080 0.007 0.076  0.095 0.093 -0.002 0.094  
 (0.260) (0.271)  (0.265)  (0.293) (0.290)  (0.292)  
Head is a wage worker 0.381 0.393 0.012 0.387  0.414 0.444 0.030 0.429  
 (0.486) (0.488)  (0.487)  (0.493) (0.497) ** (0.495)  
Head’s age (yrs) 46.988 46.877 -0.111 46.933  47.671 47.602 -0.069 47.637  
 (10.738) (10.957)  (10.845)  (10.623) (10.445)  (10.535)  
Muslim 0.919 0.922 0.003 0.921  0.890 0.893 0.003 0.892  
 (0.272) (0.268)  (0.270)  (0.313) (0.309)  (0.311)  
Hindu 0.076 0.071 -0.005 0.073  0.093 0.093 0.000 0.093  
 (0.265) (0.256)  (0.261)  (0.290) (0.290)  (0.290)  
Obs 2,488 2,390  4,878  2,848 2,790  5,638  
Enrolled in secondary school children aged 11-15 
Govt school 0.25 0.23 -0.02 0.24 0.25 0.23 -0.02 0.24 
 (0.44) (0.42)  (0.43) (0.44) (0.42)  (0.43) 
Private school 0.68 0.70 0.02 0.69 0.66 0.69 0.03 0.67 
 (0.47) (0.46)  (0.46) (0.47) (0.46)  (0.47) 
Other 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.09 
 (0.25) (0.25)  (0.25) (0.28) (0.28)  (0.28) 
Obs 824 1,061  1,885 1,159 1,420  2,579 
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below the mean. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote that the means for girls and boys 
are different at 1, 5, and 10 percent significant level, respectively. “Other” in school type include all schools other than 
public and private schools, including religious (e.g., madrasa) and NGO schools. 
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Table 17: Summary statistics of annual education expenditure in take by items for secondary school enrollees 
in 2000 and 2005 
 
 
  2000     2005  
Boy (B) Girl (G) G-B % Zeros  Boy (B) Girl (G) G-B % Zeros  
BDT (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  
Core 2,116 1,681 -435 1  2,786 2,378 -408 1  
 (2,092) (1,723) ***   (2,452) (2,405) ***   
Tuition 321 131 -190 48  374 162 -212 50  
 (384) (308) ***   (489) (492) ***   
Private Tutoring 1,031 821 -210 49  1,438 1,289 -148 42  
 (1,665) (1,367) ***   (2,057) (2,046) *   
Material 764 729 -35 1  974 926 -48 1  
 (527) (486)    (589) (579) **   
Peripheral 918 878 -40 1  1,166 1,068 -99 0  
 (930) (901)    (1,383) (1,103) **   
Admission 170 152 -18 26  202 189 -14 26  
 (233) (218) *   (310) (349)    
Exam 152 143 -9 4  173 178 5 4  
 (166) (121)    (137) (181)    
Uniform 239 257 18 46  343 344 1 35  
 (315) (292)    (450) (391)    
Meal 176 176 0 63  193 155 -38 68  
 (368) (349)    (409) (359) **   
Transportation 121 111 -10 84  119 129 10 86  
 (420) (401)    (492) (507)    
Others 60 38 -22 75  136 73 -63 66  
 (312) (214) *   (794) (251) ***   
Total 3,034 2,559 -475   3,952 3,445 -507   
 (2,665) (2,319) ***   (3,127) (2,979) ***   
Core Share 0.68 0.63 -0.05   0.69 0.65 -0.04   
 (0.18) (0.20) ***   (0.18) (0.19) ***   
Obs 824 1,061    1,159 1,420    
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below the mean. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote that the means of girl and boy 
are different at 1, 5, and 10 percent significant level, respectively. The summary statistics is for the subsample of 
children who were enrolled in secondary school at the time of survey. Core share stands for the share of the core 
components in the total education expenditure. The annual session and registration fees are included in admission to 
maintain consistency with Table 3. 
  
 
 
Table 18: ML estimation of three-part model with dependence for secondary-school age group 
 
 1995    2000    2005    2010   
Coef. d Cond y Cond s  d Cond y Cond s  d Cond y Cond s  d Cond y Cond s 
Girl -0.001 -0.085*** 0.001  0.339*** -0.174*** -0.082***  0.291*** -0.154*** -0.071***  0.289*** -0.131*** -0.067***  
 (0.042) (0.032) (0.032)  (0.039) (0.049) (0.014)  (0.034) (0.027) (0.012)  (0.033) (0.025) (0.009)  
Log(per capita exp) 0.505*** 0.755*** -0.326  0.480*** 0.793*** -0.124***  0.374*** 0.609*** -0.078***  0.357*** 0.701*** -0.046**  
 (0.047) (0.043) (0.261)  (0.050) (0.052) (0.041)  (0.044) (0.034) (0.027)  (0.046) (0.034) (0.022)  
Log(hh size) 0.090 0.116* -0.033  0.142* 0.222*** -0.014  -0.089 0.139*** 0.025  0.124 0.317*** -0.049**  
 (0.083) (0.068) (0.052)  (0.084) (0.068) (0.025)  (0.075) (0.053) (0.019)  (0.082) (0.064) (0.021)  
Father edu (yrs) 0.081*** 0.014** -0.006  0.073*** -0.005 -0.008***  0.062*** 0.006 -0.009***  0.039*** 0.010** -0.004***  
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.007) (0.011) (0.002)  (0.006) (0.005) (0.002)  (0.006) (0.004) (0.001)  
Mother edu (yrs) 0.088*** 0.025*** -0.010  0.068*** -0.007 -0.008***  0.066*** 0.023*** -0.009***  0.073*** 0.017*** -0.008***  
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.009)  (0.009) (0.010) (0.002)  (0.008) (0.006) (0.002)  (0.007) (0.005) (0.002)  
No. of children 0.008 -0.004 -0.001  -0.026* -0.022 0.003  -0.015 -0.024* -0.006  -0.028 -0.021 0.009**  
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.007)  (0.015) (0.014) (0.004)  (0.017) (0.013) (0.004)  (0.018) (0.016) (0.004)  
Urban -0.082 0.257*** -0.097  -0.121** 0.287*** 0.000  -0.095** 0.275*** -0.011  -0.140*** 0.233*** 0.052***  
 (0.053) (0.045) (0.091)  (0.048) (0.046) (0.020)  (0.040) (0.030) (0.016)  (0.040) (0.029) (0.012)  
Female head -0.038 -0.069 -0.019  0.106 0.004 -0.027  0.030 0.097* 0.016  -0.062 0.103** -0.004  
 (0.084) (0.074) (0.044)  (0.078) (0.075) (0.022)  (0.068) (0.050) (0.019)  (0.058) (0.046) (0.014)  
Head is a wage worker -0.103** 0.029 -0.044*  -0.201*** 0.152*** 0.028*  -0.210*** 0.086*** 0.037***  -0.145*** 0.023 0.015*  
 (0.049) (0.041) (0.023)  (0.045) (0.052) (0.014)  (0.038) (0.030) (0.011)  (0.038) (0.029) (0.009)  
Head’s age (yrs) 0.000 -0.003* 0.001  0.001 -0.005*** -0.001  -0.004** 0.001 -0.000  -0.004** -0.003** 0.000  
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)  
Muslim -0.239 -0.138 0.079  0.219 0.128 0.143**  -0.073 -0.246*** 0.000  0.199 -0.219* 0.039  
 (0.244) (0.138) (0.075)  (0.312) (0.186) (0.064)  (0.167) (0.094) (0.045)  (0.211) (0.123) (0.052)  
Hindu -0.062 -0.128 0.086  0.306 0.263 0.140**  -0.132 -0.161 0.020  0.216 -0.189 0.070  
 (0.253) (0.144) (0.075)  (0.318) (0.197) (0.067)  (0.177) (0.101) (0.046)  (0.217) (0.128) (0.053)  
Secondary school accessibility 2.454***    5.940***    1.487***    2.501***    
 (0.606)    (1.019)    (0.364)    (0.447)    
Madrasa school accessibility -0.287    -6.142***    0.274    0.763    
 (0.912)    (1.045)    (0.463)    (0.535)    
Public school  0.160    0.208**    0.135**    0.275***   
  (0.121)    (0.092)    (0.058)    (0.058)   
Private school  0.195    0.387***    0.286***    0.430***   
  (0.128)    (0.083)    (0.054)    (0.052)   
Log(education expend)   0.449    0.068    0.061    0.032  
   (0.343)    (0.050)    (0.043)    (0.029)  
σy  0.681***    0.740***    0.650***    0.671***   
  (0.017)    (0.056)    (0.017)    (0.015)   
σs  0.321*    0.242***    0.257***    0.235***   
  (0.190)    (0.013)    (0.010)    (0.010)   
ρdy  0.192** 
(0.076) 
   -0.456** 
(0.192) 
   -0.196*** 
(0.072) 
   -0.285*** 
(0.075) 
  
ρds  -0.165    -0.829***    -0.935***    -0.894***   
  (0.116)    (0.081)    (0.025)    (0.029)   
ρys  -0.810***    0.146    0.100    0.221**   
  (0.250)    (0.178)    (0.124)    (0.094)   
Observations  5,011    4,878    5,638    6,205   
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. School accessibility variables are the number 
of secondary schools or madrasa per 1000 people, which is calculated at the subdivision level (for 2000) or district level (for all other years). Age-specific fixed-effects terms are also included in each regression (not 
reported). 
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Table 19: ML estimation of the three-part model with different error structure 
 
 
 d Cond y Cond s 
1995    
Independence -0.003 -0.086*** -0.030*** 
 (0.042) (0.032) (0.009) 
Dependence -0.001 -0.085*** 0.001 
 (0.042) (0.032) (0.032) 
2000    
Independence 0.331*** -0.111*** -0.047*** 
 (0.041) (0.032) (0.009) 
Dependence 0.339*** -0.174*** -0.082*** 
 (0.039) (0.049) (0.014) 
2005    
Independence 0.309*** -0.131*** -0.027*** 
 (0.037) (0.025) (0.007) 
Dependence 0.291*** -0.154*** -0.071*** 
 (0.034) (0.027) (0.012) 
2010    
Independence 0.295*** -0.101*** -0.031*** 
 (0.035) (0.024) (0.006) 
Dependence 0.289*** -0.131*** -0.067*** 
 (0.033) (0.025) (0.009) 
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Standard errors clustered at household level are reported in parentheses. “Independence” rows 
are estimated under the assumption: ρdy = ρds = ρys = 0. “Dependence” rows are the same as 
those reported in columns (4)-(6) of Table 4. 
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Table 20: Results of the pooled regression using the three-part model 
 
 
 d Cond y Cond s 
Coef.  (1) (2) (3) 
Girl  0.029 -0.097*** -0.032*** 
  (0.040) (0.033) (0.010) 
Y00  -0.036 0.224*** -0.017 
  (0.039) (0.035) (0.011) 
Y05  -0.042 0.400*** -0.037*** 
  (0.040) (0.032) (0.013) 
Y10  -0.161*** 
(0.045) 
0.541*** 
(0.035) 
-0.054*** 
(0.016) 
Girl ×Y00  0.317*** 
(0.055) 
-0.059 
(0.047) 
-0.050*** 
(0.015) 
Girl ×Y05  0.259*** (0.053) -0.072* 
(0.042) 
-0.034** 
(0.014) 
Girl ×Y10  0.260*** (0.052) -0.038 
(0.041) 
-0.032** 
(0.013) 
Obs   21,732  
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. Additional controls include the 
set of covariates discussed in Table 4except that the school accessibility variables are constructed at 
subdivision level for all years to have a uniform definition across years. Year 1995 is the base year for 
comparison in these regressions. 
Table 21: Estimation of the three-part model by the urban and rural subsamples 
 
 
 Urban    Rural   
Coef. d Cond y Cond s  d Cond y Cond s 
1995         
Girl 0.094 0.008 -0.030*  -0.047 -0.131*** 0.010  
 (0.072) (0.047) (0.016)  (0.053) (0.043) (0.047)  
Obs  1,695    3,316   
2000         
Girl 0.310*** -0.024 -0.047**  0.365*** -0.277*** -0.116***  
 (0.073) (0.053) (0.021)  (0.047) (0.059) (0.019)  
Obs  1,598    3,280   
2005         
Girl 0.264*** -0.102** -0.054***  0.318*** -0.177*** -0.081***  
 (0.060) (0.046) (0.016)  (0.042) (0.034) (0.016)  
Obs  1,921    3,717   
2010         
Girl 0.376*** -0.095** -0.069***  0.255*** -0.151*** -0.069***  
 (0.057) (0.043) (0.015)  (0.041) (0.032) (0.011)  
Obs  2,102    4,103   
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered 
at the household level are reported in parentheses. The same set of covariates is used as in Table 4 except that the 
urban dummy is dropped. 
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Table 22: Tobit marginal effect of the girl dummy on education expenditure by expenditure item among 
secondary school enrollees 
 
 
Expenditure in BDT 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Core -178.7*** -284.1*** -259.8*** -649.9*** 
 (62.7) (70.9) (77.4) (137.6) 
Tuition -228.9*** -488.0*** -694.6*** -669.0*** 
 (26.6) (38.4) (60.8) (63.5) 
Private Tutoring -142.7 -199.1* -100.1 -578.8*** 
 (87.4) (101.9) (108.2) (153.6) 
Material 1.7 -5.4 -23.1 -14.9 
 (19.3) (21.1) (20.5) (31.1) 
Peripheral 6.4 31.0 -45.0 59.8 
 (35.1) (37.5) (45.5) (69.6) 
Admission 8.8 -20.5 -15.0 -26.9 
 (11.5) (13.0) (15.5) (24.8) 
Exam 6.9 -2.3 9.6 -1.0 
 (6.4) (6.7) (6.2) (10.2) 
Uniform 70.0*** 86.5*** 25.3 49.1* 
 (22.7) (22.5) (23.8) (25.9) 
Meal -310.6 44.9 -52.4 -59.5 
 (840.1) (37.4) (40.7) (57.7) 
Transportation 9.2 -7.8 57.7 723.8*** 
 (65.8) (95.3) (109.7) (187.7) 
Obs 1,798 1,885 2,579 3,172 
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered 
at the household level are reported in parentheses. Marginal effects using Tobit regressions of education expenditure 
items evaluated at the mean of the subsample of secondary school enrollees are reported. The covariates are the 
same to those used in columns (2) and (5) of Table 4. The annual session and registration fees are also included in 
admission because they are not separately reported in HES 1995. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 23: Tobit regressions of education expenditure items for secondary school enrollees with the FSP dummy 
 
 
 Marginal effects Core Tuition Private Tutoring Material Peripheral Admission Exam Uniform Meal Transportation 
at the mean (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 FSP -72.9 -518.2*** 226.1 101.4*** 125.5** -69.5*** 14.8* 95.2*** 136.1** 283.4** 
  (95.5) (52.3) (153.4) (29.2) (51.2) (18.5) (7.8) (31.4) (53.0) (137.6) 
2000 Sec Girl -240.5** -207.7*** -337.4** -66.0** -44.1 20.9 -11.2 29.5 -39.1 -182.8 
  (94.5) (35.9) (141.3) (27.1) (45.5) (18.8) (7.3) (27.8) (48.8) (126.5) 
 Obs 1885 1885 1885 1885 1885 1885 1885 1885 1885 1885 
 FSP -112.3 -704.9*** 245.3 64.8** 4.7 -70.2*** 1.7 61.3** 67.8 163.7 
  (107.7) (86.6) (154.7) (28.0) (54.3) (23.4) (9.8) (30.8) (55.5) (151.2) 
2005 Sec Girl -202.1** -383.7*** -228.7 -56.4** -47.4 20.7 8.7 -6.4 -87.9* -26.8 
  (99.4) (51.0) (139.7) (25.1) (58.5) (22.5) (9.3) (29.5) (51.6) (135.5) 
 Obs 2579 2579 2579 2579 2579 2579 2579 2579 2579 2579 
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. Marginal 
effects at the sample mean using Tobit regressions of each education expenditure item for the subsample of school enrollees are reported. The covariates are the same as those used 
in columns (2) and (5) of Table 4. The annual session and registration fees are included in admission to be consistent with Table 3. 
6
8
 
